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Abstract: The vast majority of charities in the United States operate in a regulatory blind 
spot: they are neither meaningfully evaluated when they apply for charitable status nor 
substantively monitored after they receive charitable status. Driven by severe budget 
constraints, the IRS decided to essentially ignore any charity that claims it will realize less 
than $50,000 in annual gross receipts. From a practical perspective, the IRS’s decision makes 
sense. To the extent smaller charities are less likely to cause harm, it is reasonable (perhaps 
even preferable) to subject them to less scrutiny. This type of prioritization, known as risk-
based regulation, has become increasingly popular as regulatory budgets have continued to 
shrink. But however intuitive, reasonable, or widespread risk-based regulation may seem, the 
fact remains that the IRS has effectively absolved itself of its duty to oversee the majority of 
charities. 
This Article explores, on both a micro- and macro-level, the negative consequences of the 
IRS’s decision to leave smaller charities unregulated. On the micro-level, the lack of 
regulation impacts virtually every person who interacts with the charitable sector, including 
donors, beneficiaries of charities, and private actors in the market. On the macro-level, as an 
increasing number of charities operate without proper regulation, the public will lose faith in 
the charitable sector and the “halo effect” enjoyed by all charitable organizations will erode. 
This Article is the first to identify and discuss the harms associated with the IRS’s failure 
to apply either front-end or back-end scrutiny to smaller charities. To address this regulatory 
failure, this Article argues that the IRS should require a more robust retrospective regulatory 
tool for all charities, regardless of size. This solution represents a cost-effective means for the 
IRS to meet its regulatory burden in a manner that will help restore public faith in the 
charitable sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the not-too-distant past, an aspiring charity1 would be forced to 
wait an unbearably long time for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to 
process its tax-exempt application.2 Due to a series of increasingly 
severe budget cuts, the IRS was unable to review applications in a timely 
manner.3 Wait times as long as ten months,4 eighteen months,5 and even 
                                                     
1. Throughout this Article, “charity” and “charitable status” will refer to public charities 
described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
2. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 39 (2015) [hereinafter 
2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT] (“By 2012, the volume of [the IRS’s] open inventory was 
36,034 cases, applications requiring little or no development were taking four months to close, and 
applications requiring assignment to a reviewer were taking nine months just to be assigned.”). 
3. George K. Yin, The IRS’s Misuse of Scarce EO Compliance Resources, 146 TAX NOTES 267, 
268 (2015) (“The IRS has accumulated a massive backlog of applications, causing unacceptable 
delays in their processing, and it is now under severe budgetary constraints, with no relief in 
sight.”). 
4. Kelly P. Erb, IRS Announces Shorter, Faster Application For Some Tax Exempt Organizations, 
FORBES (July 1, 2014, 9:21 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/07/01/irs-announces-
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two years6 were so common that the IRS began to post the average age 
of pending tax-exempt applications on a website called Where’s My 
Exemption Application? to address the public’s frequent questions about 
pending tax-exempt applications.7 For nonprofit professionals, attorneys 
representing charities, and anxious leaders of nonprofits awaiting their 
tax-exempt determination letter, a visit to this website was a weekly ritual.8 
The Where’s My Exemption Application? website posted the average 
age of pending applications—a minimal, but precious, piece of 
information. For example, a visitor in July 2014 would see the following 
notice: “The average age of our pending application inventory now is 
October 2013,”9 meaning that applications submitted ten months prior to 
visiting the site were still waiting for IRS review.10 This ten-month delay 
was only an average, meaning there were likely some applications that 
were submitted much earlier than October 2013.11 Most frustratingly, the 
website did not provide specific information about any individual 
application. But however meager or dispiriting, the Where’s My 
Exemption Application? website was the only way for applicants to get 
an idea of when they might learn the outcome of their tax-exempt 
application. 
Today, the process is much different. A visitor to the new Where’s My 
Exemption Application? website is informed that they should hear back 
from the IRS within either 90 or 180 days, depending on which 
application they submitted.12 Indeed, tax-exempt applications are 
routinely approved in as little as two weeks.13 This newfound efficiency, 
                                                                                                                      
shorter-faster-application-for-some-tax-exempt-organizations/ [http://perma.cc/ZV2P-YVYA] 
(“Yes, that does mean that ten months—or about 300 days—after an initial application, 
organizations are still waiting to hear about tax-exempt status. That kind of wait time is ridiculous 
not only for tax exempt organizations but for individuals who wish to support them.”). 
5. 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 39 (“By 2013, the application inventory 
backlog stood at about 66,000 cases, and applications requiring review took a year and a half to be 
assigned.”) (emphasis added). 
6. As anecdotal evidence, one of my clients waited for over two years before receiving the IRS 
determination letter on a tax-exempt application. 
7. Steve Vick, Where is My IRS Tax Exempt Application?, NONPROFITALLY (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://nonprofitally.com/where-is-my-irs-tax-exempt-application/ [https://perma.cc/2XD8-EKFF].  
8. As an attorney who represented a number of nonprofit professionals and leaders, I can attest 
that this website was relied upon heavily to track the status of applications. Unfortunately for the 
client discussed in footnote 6, supra, the weekly ritual lasted for over two years.  
9. See Erb, supra note 4. 
10. Id.  
11. See supra notes 4–6. 
12. Where’s My Exemption Application?, IRS, www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-
organizations/wheres-my-application [http://perma.cc/67BM-PEVB]. 
13. See The Director, Reform It Now Receives IRS Determination, REFORM IT NOW (Aug. 15, 
2014), https://www.reformitnow.org/news/reform-now-receives-irs-determination/ 
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although laudable, comes at a great cost. To expedite application review, 
the IRS decided to simply ignore the majority of applicants by adopting 
a streamlined application for smaller charities. This application, the 
Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or Form 1023-EZ (the 
“Streamlined Application”), was crafted under the assumption that it was 
inefficient to subject all charities to the “same lengthy application 
process” regardless of whether the charity was “a small soccer or 
gardening club or a major research organization.”14 Designed 
specifically for organizations that have less than $250,000 in assets and 
reasonably expect to have less than $50,000 of gross receipts in any of 
the subsequent three years (“Smaller Charities”),15 the Streamlined 
Application requires almost no disclosures and bestows charitable status 
with virtually no investigation into the applicant’s worthiness.16 
The justification for this change was simple: the IRS believed that 
Smaller Charities represented lower risk and did not require the same 
level of scrutiny that larger charities demanded.17 As a result, the IRS 
crafted an application designed to process applications in a more 
efficient manner. But with what must have been a myopic focus on the 
application backlog, the IRS crafted an inadequate screening process. 
Indeed, the Streamlined Application is virtually devoid of rigor and 
provides no means for meaningful investigation.18 
This is troubling for a number of reasons, but this Article is primarily 
concerned with the fact that the charitable sector relies, largely, upon the 
good will associated with the charitable designation (for instance, the 
501(c)(3) status bestowed by the IRS). In 2017, charities received 
$410.02 billion in charitable contributions from the public.19 Although a 
cynic might assume that this giving was inspired by a desire to take 
                                                                                                                      
[http://perma.cc/7UA6-CHM4] (“Literally . . . we were able to file for 501(c)(3) status on August 1st, 
and received the detemination [sic] letter on August 14th. The IRS processed the application in 8 
calendar days.”). 
14. New 1023-EZ Form Makes Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status Easier; Most Charities 
Qualify IR-2014-77, IRS (July 1, 2014), www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/New-1023-EZ-Form-Makes-
Applying-for-501c3Tax-Exempt-Status-Easier-Most-Charities-Qualify [http://perma.cc/VV9Y-
H7J4] [hereinafter IRS Press Release]. 
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 66268Y, INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 1023-EZ (2018), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023ez.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3VN-3V52]. 
16. See infra sections I.A.2, I.A.3. 
17. See IRS Press Release, supra note 14. 
18. Yin, supra note 3 (“[T]here is essentially no information obtained about applicants 
upfront . . . .”). 
19. Brice McKeever, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2018, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STAT. 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://nccs.urban.org/publication/nonprofit-sector-brief-2018#giving 
[https://perma.cc/AF86-KH89]. 
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advantage of the tax-deductibility of donations to charities, the fact 
remains that most donors do not itemize their deductions.20 Rather, most 
donors give to charities because they either believe in the goals of the 
charitable organizations, or they feel like better people when they give to 
worthy organizations. Although the latter reason, also known as the 
“warm glow” effect, appears to be less substantive than a tax-deduction 
or support of a cause one believes in, it should not be ignored. Indeed, 
many scholars argue that the search for “warm glow” explains why 
many donors choose to give. Thus, the failure to adequately screen 
charities represents a potential existential threat to the charitable 
sector—if people no longer can trust that a charity has been properly 
vetted to ensure that the organization is organized for charitable 
purposes, there would be a diminished warm glow gleaned from any 
giving, and it would be rational for donors to stop or reduce their giving. 
It is perhaps for this reason that the decision to implement the 
Streamlined Application was widely criticized.21 The National Taxpayer 
Advocate bemoaned that the “the IRS relinquished its power to 
effectively determine whether applicants qualify as [charitable] 
organizations,”22 and the President of the National Council of 
Nonprofits, a network of charitable groups, contemptuously noted that 
“it takes more to get a library card than it takes to get this new exempt 
status.”23 As hyperbolic as they seem, such criticisms are not 
overstatements: one can comfortably argue that the Streamlined 
Application allows a Smaller Charity to opt-in to the tax-exempt realm 
without any inquiry into its worthiness.24 Thus, in the name of 
efficiency, the IRS adopted a woefully ineffective screening mechanism. 
Defenders of the IRS might argue that the Streamlined Application is 
a rational response of an underfunded agency in the face of an untenable 
                                                     
20. See Briefing Book, TAX POL'Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-
itemized-deductions-and-who-claims-them [https://perma.cc/YF9Z-469R] (“In recent years about 
30 percent of taxpayers, mostly high income, have chosen to itemize, but increases in the standard 
deduction and limits to itemized deductions starting in 2018 will greatly reduce the number of 
itemizers.”). 
21. Patricia Cohen, I.R.S. Shortcut to Tax-Exempt Status is Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/business/irs-shortcut-to-tax-exempt-status-is-under-
fire.html [https://perma.cc/Z6TJ-TH6R]; see also Manoj Viswanathan, Essay, Form 1023-EZ and 
the Streamlined Process for the Federal Income Tax Exemption: Is the IRS Slashing Red Tape or 
Opening Pandora’s Box?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 89 (2014–2015); Yin, supra note 3. 
22. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44. 
23. See Cohen, supra note 21. 
24. See Yin supra note 3, at 268 (suggesting, perhaps sarcastically, that “the IRS should consider 
an even simpler form: a one-line version that merely asks applicants to attest (by checking a single 
box) that they qualify for (c)(3) status”); infra section I.A.C.3. 
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regulatory burden.25 Indeed, given limited regulatory resources, there is 
an intuitive appeal to focusing on the population that presents the 
greatest risk. This choice, shifting regulatory resources, attention, and 
energy to the population that presents the greatest potential harm, is 
known as “risk-based regulation.”26 But the logical consequence of risk-
based regulation is that, although high-risk populations receive the 
attention they deserve, low-risk populations necessarily receive lower 
levels of regulatory scrutiny.27 This is the cost of risk-based regulation, 
and such cost is reasonable as long as the potential harms caused by the 
low-risk population are acceptably low.28 Following this logic, a 
regulatory agency might justifiably lessen the scrutiny of low-risk 
populations by, for example, fashioning a simplified screening 
mechanism or requiring less annual reporting. However, while risk-
based regulation theories might permit such actions, even the most 
generous reading of risk-based regulation theory does not condone 
completely ignoring low-risk populations.29 
Perhaps in anticipation of this criticism, the IRS promised to put more 
resources into monitoring charities.30 In the press release announcing the 
Streamlined Application, the IRS Commissioner John Koskinen said, 
“[r]ather than using large amounts of IRS resources up front reviewing 
complex applications during a lengthy process, we believe the 
[Streamlined Application] will allow us to devote more compliance 
activity on the back end to ensure groups are actually doing the 
charitable work they apply to do.”31 In this manner, the IRS argued that 
if any bad actors were to obtain tax-exempt status through the 
Streamlined Application, a more robust monitoring system would catch 
them.32 In other words, the lack of any front-end scrutiny should not give 
rise to criticism so long as there is ongoing review and inspection. 
                                                     
25. Joe Davidson, IRS Chief Departs, Blasting Congress for Budget Cuts Threatening Tax Agency, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/11/07/irs-
chief-departs-blasting-congress-for-budget-cuts-threatening-tax-agency/ [https://perma.cc/ZNQ9-7K76]. 
26. Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Approaches and 
Challenges, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 2, 2 (2012). 
27. Id. at 3–4. 
28. Robert Baldwin, Julia Black & Gerard O’Leary, Regulating Low Risks: Innovative Strategies 
and Implementation 2 (Law, Soc’y & Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper No. 9/2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258976 [https://perma.cc/ED9W-XMG9]. 
29. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 2 (“The bulk of regulated sites and operations, 
however, tend to present lower levels of risk and most regulators need to deal with lower risks in 
some way or other. Such risks have some capacity to produce both significant harms and political 
contention, and in many cases the law will demand that lower risks be attended to.”). 
30. See IRS Press Release, supra note 14. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.  
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Unfortunately, the monitoring mechanisms for Smaller Charities are, 
like the Streamlined Application itself, wholly inadequate. Smaller 
Charities are required to submit only the e-Postcard, an annual 
information return that contains virtually no information about the 
organization’s activities33 and elicits data so scant as to leave virtually no 
opportunity for scrutiny.34 
Similar to the way poor screening threatens to curb the warm glow of 
giving, the failure to monitor charities presents another potential blow to 
the charitable sector. Indeed, the failure to monitor might be more 
damaging than the failure to screen. Although poor screening might 
allow unworthy organizations to call themselves “charities,” a robust 
monitoring mechanism would be able to identify those charities acting in 
an inappropriate manner. For example, imagine that a charity promised 
to work to solve the homelessness crisis in Seattle. This is a laudable 
goal that deserves charitable status. But now imagine that this charity 
spends all donations on lavish dinners for the founders and fails to spend 
any resources on homelessness prevention or amelioration. A more 
robust screening process would not identify this activity; after all, the 
charity looked legitimate at the application stage. This example 
demonstrates the need for a system that periodically checks in on 
charities to ensure that they are not only formed to engage in charitable 
activities, but that they actually engage in the charities they were formed 
to do. Unfortunately, the current regulatory regime fails to implement 
either adequate front-end scrutiny or back-end scrutiny for Smaller 
Charities, resulting in a reality in which Smaller Charities are vetted 
neither prospectively nor retrospectively. 
This Article argues that this regulatory blind spot is unacceptable. A 
few legal scholars have joined the chorus of critics35 to denounce the 
insufficiency of the Streamlined Application,36 but this Article is the first 
to consider the shortcomings of the Streamlined Application in 
conjunction with the inadequate monitoring regime for Smaller 
Charities. This is also the first article to recognize the fact that the IRS, 
as currently funded, is incapable of properly vetting all applications for 
                                                     
33. See Annual Electronic Filing Requirement for Small Exempt Organizations — Form 990-N 
(e-Postcard), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-electronic-filing-requirement-
for-small-exempt-organizations-form-990-n-e-postcard [https://perma.cc/CQH9-2YAZ] [hereinafter 
Filing Requirements for Form 990-N]. 
34. See infra Section I.B.2. 
35. See, e.g., 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 (highlighting the failure of 
the Form 1023-EZ to properly assess the worthiness of tax-exempt applications); Cohen, supra note 
21 (noting the “unlikely coalition of tax lawyers, state enforcement agents and even many 
nonprofits” speaking up against the adoption of the Form 1023-EZ). 
36. See Viswanathan, supra note 21; Yin, supra note 3. 
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charitable status in a satisfactory manner, which makes any suggested 
changes to the Streamlined Application infeasible. Rather than focus on 
fixing the flaws of the Streamlined Application, this Article suggests 
revising and imposing a more robust monitoring mechanism. This 
solution addresses the regulatory failure and recognizes the IRS’s 
crippling funding shortage by both providing the IRS with enough data 
to properly monitor Smaller Charities and fostering the transparency 
necessary to empower the public to police the activities of Smaller 
Charities. 
Part I of this Article discusses the IRS’s tools for screening and 
monitoring charities, including a detailed discussion of tax-exempt 
applications and annual reporting requirements. This discussion will 
highlight the failure of the existing regulatory regime for Smaller 
Charities. Part II discusses the potential harms of ignoring Smaller 
Charities, exploring both the micro-level harms incurred when 
individual charities engage in impermissible activities and the macro-
level harms of persistent and widespread violations in the charitable 
sector. Part III of this Article discusses risk-based regulation generally 
and explores the specific challenges posed by regulating low-risk 
populations.37 This Part will set forth Julia Black and Robert Baldwin’s 
recommended framework for choosing appropriate regulatory tools for 
low-risk populations and apply it to Smaller Charities. This Part makes it 
clear that the IRS’s chosen regulatory strategy fails to provide the 
minimum regulatory scrutiny of low-risk populations. To remedy this 
failure, Part IV argues that the IRS ought to implement a more rigorous 
annual reporting requirement to properly monitor the activities of 
Smaller Charities. 
I. THE REGULATORY TOOLS OF THE CHARITABLE REGIME 
The IRS is responsible for both assessing the worthiness of 
organizations vying for charitable status and reviewing the activities of 
existing charities to ensure continued compliance with the law. This 
Article will refer to these two responsibilities as, respectively, the 
screening function and the monitoring function. Although other federal 
agencies might have a hand in monitoring charitable contributions38 and 
many state actors have a role in the oversight of charities,39 the IRS is 
                                                     
37. See Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: A Strategic 
Framework, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 131 (2012); supra notes 26, 28. 
38. See, e.g., The Crimes Against Charitable Americans Act of 2001, USA Patriot Act § 1011, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6102, 6106 (2012) (giving the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate for-
profit third parties that solicit charitable contributions on behalf of charities). 
39. Secretaries of state, for example, regulate the formation of charities at the state level and state 
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the agency in charge of determining whether a particular organization 
qualifies as a tax-exempt charity40 and imposing reporting requirements 
to ensure charities continue to act in accordance with regulations.41 It 
may seem a bit odd that the agency in charge of collecting taxes is 
tasked with determining the worthiness of charities,42 but however 
counterintuitive, the IRS has embraced its regulatory role and has 
developed both screening tools for aspiring charities and monitoring 
tools for established charities. These tools—the tax-exempt application 
process and the annual information returns—are discussed in detail in 
the following sections. 
A. The Screening Tool: The Tax-Exempt Application Process 
Entities recognized by the IRS as charities enjoy a number of 
benefits.43 As tax-exempt entities, they are, of course, exempt from 
paying federal taxes on income.44 Perhaps more importantly, individuals 
who donate money to charities may take a deduction on their personal 
taxes.45 The deductibility of donations is one of the more remarkable 
benefits of becoming a charitable organization. The justification for the 
charitable deduction is that incentivizing private donations might 
promote more charitable activity. The fact that individuals can deduct 
donations from their personal taxes suggests something of an 
equivalence between paying taxes and contributing to charities.46 
                                                                                                                      
attorneys general have the authority to prosecute fraud committed by charities. See, e.g., Danny 
Hakim, New York Attorney General Sues Trump Foundation After 2-Year Investigation, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 14, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/nyregion/trump-foundation-lawsuit-attorney-
general.html [https://perma.cc/WZM7-8BUV] (discussing the New York State attorney general’s 
lawsuit against the Trump Foundation). 
40. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Pub. 557, TAX EXEMPT 
STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION (2008) [hereinafter IRS Pub. 557], www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p557.pdf [https://perma.cc/9THQ-ZZW4] (describing the IRS’s procedures for entities applying 
for tax-exempt status). 
41. Id.  
42. Lloyd H. Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An 
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 498 (2010) ("[I]t is generally recognized 
that Congress . . . did not intend for the IRS to become a national regulator of the charitable 
sector.”). 
43. See generally Roger Colinvaux & Harvey Dale, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: 
Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX LAW. 331 (2015). 
44. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
45. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(vii) (2012). The amount of the deduction is limited to a percentage of the 
donor’s adjusted gross income and dependent on whether the tax-exempt entity is a public charity or 
a private foundation. 
46. See Eric F. Amarante, Why Don’t Some White Supremacist Groups Pay Taxes, 67 EMORY L.J. 
ONLINE 2045, 2051 (2018) (“By allowing [the] tax deduction, we imply an equivalence between 
donating to tax-exempt organizations and paying taxes. For most tax-exempt entities, this makes 
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Further, many states piggyback on the IRS’s tax-exempt determination 
to provide analogous benefits in the form of exemptions from state 
income and sales taxes.47 Given these benefits, it is important to ensure 
that the mechanism for approving charitable status is as effective as 
possible. This mechanism, the tax-exempt application process, requires 
organizations to complete one of two forms: the Form 1023 (the 
traditional application) or the recently implemented Streamlined 
Application.48 
1. The Form 1023: The Traditional Screening Tool 
Until recently, almost all organizations that hoped to obtain charitable 
status were required to complete the same application: the Application 
for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, more commonly known as the Form 1023.49 There are a 
few exceptions to this requirement,50 but the vast majority of aspiring 
charities were, until 2014, required to complete the Form 1023. The first 
thing most people notice about the Form 1023 is its length. The 
application is twenty-six pages long with thirty-eight pages of 
accompanying instructions.51 The application requires a number of 
attachments and exhibits, including the organization’s formation 
document52 and bylaws;53 the names, addresses, and biographies of the 
                                                                                                                      
sense. Organizations that provide shelter to the homeless, for example, provide a service that many 
believe the government should provide. Thus, perhaps payments to such organizations should be 
treated as if they were payments to the government (i.e., taxes).”); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“When the Government . . . allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; 
the very fact of the . . . deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect 
and vicarious ‘donors.’”). 
47. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-322 (West 2010) (exempting charities from the Tennessee 
state sales tax). 
48. See Public Charity – Tax Exemption Application, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/charitable-organizations/public-charity-exemption-application [https://perma.cc/4GEF-
A663]. 
49. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB No. 1545-0056, FORM 1023: 
APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE (2017) [hereinafter Form 1023], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2SQV-5BGU]. 
50. Some notable exceptions to the application requirement include churches and very small 
organizations (those that anticipate less than $5,000 in gross receipts). See Organizations Not 
Required to File Form 1023, IRS, www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-
organizations/organizations-not-required-to-file-form-1023 [http://perma.cc/HX4U-HG3M]. 
51. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV, CAT. NO. 17132Z, INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 1023, APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2017) [hereinafter Instructions for Form 1023], 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CH8-3RDG]. 
52. In most states, formation documents are called the articles of incorporation.  See Form 1023, 
supra note 49 at 2, pt. II, l. 1 (“Organizational Structure.”).  
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board of directors;54 the salaries of the five highest paid employees and 
five highest paid independent contractors;55 and several years’ worth of 
pro forma financial statements.56 These requests, however, represent a 
relatively small percentage of most completed applications. 
The bulk of most submissions is generally the response to Part IV of 
the Form 1023, which requires a narrative description of the 
organization’s “past, present, and planned activities” (the “Narrative”).57 
The Narrative is the opportunity for the applicant to “fully describe all of 
the activities in which it expects to engage, including standards, criteria, 
procedures, or other means adopted or planned for carrying out the 
[charitable] activities.”58 In other words, this is where the applicant 
makes the case that its activities are deserving of tax-exempt status.59 
The IRS reserves the right to deny tax-exempt status if the applicant 
does not present a “meaningful explanation of [the applicant’s] 
activities,” or if the applicant “provides only general information, lacks 
sufficient detail, does not fully describe the organization’s 
programs . . . , [or] is otherwise vague.”60 In short, the Narrative is an 
opportunity for applicants to convince the IRS that the organization’s 
activities justify tax-exemption.61 
Once completed, the twenty-six-page form, the required attachments, 
and the Narrative all combine to create an impressive document. 
According to a private group that provides guidance on completing the 
Form 1023, “a typical application package is between 50–100 pages of 
material.”62 All told, this application provides the IRS with a relatively 
complete picture of what the organization hopes to accomplish,63 how 
the organization plans to meet those goals,64 how much money it hopes 
                                                                                                                      
53. See id. at 2, pt. II, l. 5 (“Organizational Structure”). 
54. See id. at 2, pt. V, l. 3a (“Compensation and Other Financial Arrangements with Your 
Officers, Directors, Trustees, Employees, and Independent Contractors”). 
55. See id. at 2, pt. V, l. 1b (“Compensation and Other Financial Arrangements with Your 
Officers, Directors, Trustees, Employees, and Independent Contractors”). 
56. See id. at 10, pt. IX (“Financial Data”). Note that the form requires applicants to provide 
either three or four years’ worth of financial information, depending on the age of the applicant. 
57. See Instructions for Form 1023, supra note 51, at 8. 
58. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 798 (11th ed. 2015). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 799 (quotations omitted). 
61. See id. 
62. See How Long Does It Take to Complete Form 1023, FOUND. GROUP, 
www.501c3.org/frequently-asked-questions/how-long-does-it-take-to-complete-form-1023/ 
[http://perma.cc/TTR3-YRAQ].  
63. See Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt.  IV (“Narrative Description of Your Activities”). 
64. Id.  
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to raise,65 how much it plans to spend in salaries,66 and why the 
organization believes it deserves tax-exempt status.67 At this point, it 
should be noted that the IRS approves the vast majority of tax-exempt 
applications. For example, the IRS approved 94% of all tax-exempt 
applications in 2014, which suggests an application process that is less 
than rigorous.68 However, this generous approval rate is not the fault of 
the Form 1023, but rather the IRS’s inability to adequately review all the 
information provided by Form 1023s. In sum, the Form 1023 provides a 
fair amount of information for the IRS to determine if the organization is 
worthy of charitable status. Unfortunately, one could not in good 
conscience say the same about the Streamlined Application. 
2. The Form 1023-EZ: “A radical change to a decades-old 
process”69 
Introduced in 2014, the Streamlined Application represents a 
dramatically different approach to assessing applicants.70 Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine how the Streamlined Application could be more 
dissimilar from the Form 1023. In place of the traditional form’s rather 
intimidating twenty-six-page length, the Streamlined Application is only 
three pages long.71 And as the balance of this Section illustrates, 
describing the form as “three pages” might overstate its substance. 
The Streamlined Application consists primarily of benign 
informational requests and clumsilyworded questions and attestations. 
Given its brevity, rather than describe the Streamlined Application, it 
might be more illuminating to point out what is missing. For example, 
unlike the Form 1023, the applicant is not required to provide its 
formation document or bylaws.72 Thus, the IRS is unable to discern if 
                                                     
65. See id. at 10, pt. IX (“Financial Data”). 
66. See id. at 2, pt. V (“Compensation and Other Financial Arrangements With Your Officers, 
Directors, Trustees, Employees, and Independent Contractors”). 
67. See id. at 2, pt. IV (“Narrative Description of Your Activities”).  
68. See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 
at 71 (2016), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-JRC/Volume_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RA7A-J2WX].  
69. Viswanathan, supra note 21, at 89. 
70. See IRS Press Release, supra note 14. 
71. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO.1545-0056, FORM 1023-EZ, 
STREAMLINED APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2014) [hereinafter Form 1023-EZ], www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f1023ez.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQS2-VRCE]. 
72. Compare id. with Form 1023, supra note 49. The absence of an organization’s formation 
document and bylaws startled many nonprofit professionals because it made it so the IRS had no 
opportunity to ensure the applicant organization’s formation documents contain the provisions 
required fulfilled the organizational test. See Letter from Alissa H. Gardenswartz, President, Nat’l 
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the applicant has the required provisions that prohibit substantial 
noncharitable activity, private inurement, and substantial private benefit, 
or the provision that dedicates assets to charitable purposes upon 
dissolution.73 Rather than require an applicant to provide the actual 
provisions, the Streamlined Application merely requires an attestation 
that its organizing documents contain the appropriate provisions.74 
In addition to the Streamlined Application’s refusal to require 
organizational documents, the questions designed to discover the 
organization’s planned activities, salaries, and legislative activities are 
poorly crafted. Rather than permitted narrative answers, this section of 
the Streamlined Application requires the applicant to answer eight “yes” 
or “no” questions.75 These questions cover the entity’s plans to influence 
legislation, pay salaries to insiders, pay funds to individuals, work with 
foreign organizations, engage in insider transactions, incur unrelated 
business income in excess of $1,000, engage in gaming activities, or 
provide disaster relief.76 Setting aside, for the moment, the insufficiency 
of “yes” or “no” questions regarding such foundational aspects of 
organizational activity, many of these “yes” or “no” questions are 
misleading. For example, question six of Part III asks if the organization 
plans to “donate funds to or pay expenses for individual(s).”77 The 
applicant may only check “yes” or “no” and there is no opportunity for 
clarification or explanation.78 Although it may be folly to guess at the 
IRS’s justification for any individual prompt, it appears that this 
question is attempting to determine if the applicant plans to engage in an 
impermissible amount of private benefit. A charity is supposed to serve a 
public, rather than private, interest.79 Thus, any funds or expenses 
donated to an individual might be considered a benefit to that person, 
and not the public. If a charity engages in a substantial amount of such 
private benefit, it may have its tax-exemption revoked.80 For this reason, 
                                                                                                                      
Ass’n of State Charity Officials, to Sunita Lough, Comm’r, Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities Div. (May 
23, 2014) [hereinafter Letter], www.nasconet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/May-23-letter-to-
IRS-re-1023EZ.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBZ8-MWLR]. 
73. See Organizational Test – Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS, 
www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/organizational-test-internal-revenue-
code-section-501c3 [http://perma.cc/66FN-VAT3] [hereinafter Organizational Test]. 
74. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 3, pt. III, ls. 4–11. 
77. Id. at 3, pt. III, l. 6. 
78. Id. 
79. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii) (2019). 
80. See Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945); U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1990 EO CPE, C. OVERVIEW OF 
INUREMENT/PRIVATE BENEFIT ISSUES IN IRC 501(C)(3) (1990), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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a charity cannot simply collect donations and donate the money to a 
person in need. Despite the fact that this activity is, undoubtedly, 
charitable, it benefits only a single individual and not the public. But 
private benefit incidental to the accomplishment of charitable purposes, 
even if substantial, is permissible.81 For example, if a charity formed by 
lakefront property owners is dedicated to ensuring the lake, which 
includes public facilities, has clean water. Although the charity will 
clearly benefit the property owners, this benefit is merely a byproduct of 
providing a benefit to the public.82 Thus, the call of the question and the 
limited available answers suggest the clarity of black and white, when in 
fact the law is decidedly gray. There are similar concerns with respect to 
the questions regarding influencing legislation,83 engaging in financial 
transactions with insiders,84 or realizing more than $1,000 in unrelated 
business income.85 
The Streamlined Application ends with an opportunity for the 
applicant to declare its intent to operate as either a public charity or a 
private foundation.86 Depending on the applicant’s selection, the 
Streamlined Application requires an appropriate attestation. For 
example, if the organization claims to qualify as a public charity under 
Sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), it must attest that it either 
receives at least one-third of its support from contributions from the 
general public or meets the 10% facts and circumstances test. 
The Streamlined Application is completed entirely online in a matter 
of minutes.87 Indeed, it is so slight that it is reasonable to conclude that 
the form was designed not to properly screen applicants, but to create a 
process that would quickly and efficiently address the IRS’s charitable 
application backlog.88 
                                                                                                                      
tege/eotopicc90.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PLJ-E9NP]. 
81. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1990 EO CPE, C. OVERVIEW OF 
INUREMENT/PRIVATE BENEFIT ISSUES IN IRC 501(C)(3) (1990), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicc90.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PLJ-E9NP]. 
82. Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128. 
83. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 2, pt. III, l. 4. 
84. Id. at 2, pt. III, l. 8. 
85. Id. at 2, pt. III, l. 9.  
86. Id. at 2, pt. IV, l. 1a. 
87. Anecdotally, my clients are able to complete the form in about half an hour, after a few 
meetings explaining the import of the questions; see also Yin, supra note 3. 
88. See Yin, supra note 3; Letter, supra note 72 (noting that the Streamlined Application “fails to 
obtain the minimum amount of information necessary to identify organizations that should not be 
approved or should be monitored closely in back-end compliance”). 
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3. Comparing the Two Screening Tools 
As the previous sections make clear, the differences between the 
Form 1023 and the Streamlined Application are substantial. One form 
demands a significant amount of information and requires the applicant 
to prove its worthiness of tax exemption while the other form largely 
allows the applicant to attest to its worthiness. The ultimate result of the 
Streamlined Application is a lighter burden on the applicant (and, not 
coincidentally, the IRS). According to IRS estimates, applicants should 
expect to spend about 19 hours to learn about the law and complete the 
Streamlined Application,89 compared to 105 hours to complete the Form 





                                                     
89. See Instructions for Form 1023-EZ, supra note 15, at 10.  But see Letter from Tim Delaney, 
Nat’l Council of Nonprofits to the Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs 3 (Apr. 30, 2014) 
[hereinafter Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Letter], 
https://www.ctphilanthropy.org/sites/default/files/resources/National%20Council%20of%20Nonpro
fits%20Comments%20About%20IRS%20Proposed%20Form%201023-EZ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X3WB-DZQ7] (noting that completion could take “as little as an hour or so—not 
because they deliberately intend to skirt the law, but because they simply don’t know or understand 
what they are required to certify”). 
90. See Instructions for Form 1023, supra note 15. 
91. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt. III, l. 1.  
92. Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 1, pt. II, l. 5.  
94. Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 1, pt. II, l. 6.  
Requirement Form 1023 Form 1023-EZ 
Organizational 
documents must limit 
activities to 
charitable purposes 
Requires copies of the 
organizational documents 
(the articles of 
incorporation and bylaws) 
and an indication of the 




documents must not 
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93. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt. III, l. 1.  
95. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt. III, l. 2.  
96. Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 1, pt. II, l. 7.  
97. Please note that the applicant does not need to list this information for employees and 
independent contractors if the salary is less than $50,000 per year. See Form 1023, supra note 49, at 
3, pt. V. 
98. Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 2, pt. III, l. 5.  
99. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt. IV.  
100. Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 1, pt. II, ls. 5–6.  
permit engagement in 
substantial non-
exempt activities  
and an indication of the 
location of such provision93 
Organizational 
document must have 
appropriate 
dissolution provision 
Requires copy of 
organizational documents 
and an indication of the 





Requires list of five highest 
paid officers, directors, 
trustees, employees, and 
independent contractors 
and the amount of 
compensation for each97  













Narrative required99 No narrative 
required; 
attestation as to 
charitable 
activities100  
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Unsurprisingly, many commentators find the substance of the 
Streamlined Application lacking.107 The Streamlined Application 
eschews substantial disclosures that have traditionally been required of 
charities. For example, the Streamlined Application omits not only the 
Narrative—the opportunity for the would-be charity to outline its case 
that it deserves tax-exempt status—but also fails to elicit any financial 
data other than an attestation that the applicant meets the financial 
thresholds to qualify as a Smaller Charity.108 This stands in stark contrast 
to the Form 1023, which requires not only then-current financial 
information, but also projected financial statements for as many as three 
                                                     
101. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2–3, pt. V. 
102. Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71, at 2, pt. III, l. 8.  
103. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 5–7, pt. VIII, l. 15.  
104. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71. 
105. Form 1023, supra note 49, at 9–10, Pt. IX.  
106. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71. 
107. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 3, at 271 (arguing that the Form 1023-EZ “makes the entire (c)(3) 
application process, intended by Congress to give the IRS sufficient information about the ‘nature, 
purposes, and activities’ of the applicants, a sham” (citation omitted)). 
108.  That is, that the applicant projects that its annual gross receipts will not exceed $50,000 in 
any of the next three years and it has total assets less than $250,000. See Instructions for Form 
1023-EZ, supra note 15. There are a number of non-financial requirements that are less relevant to 
this discussion, including whether the organization is a foreign entity, successor organization, 
church, school, or hospital. See generally id. 
Conflicts of interest Disclosure of related 
parties and potential 
conflicts of interest 
required. A conflicts of 
interest policy, if in place, 
must be submitted. If 
organization has any 
contracts or arrangements 







If a close connection with 
another organization exists, 
the applicant must explain 
the relationship103  
No disclosure 
required104 
Financial Data Requires disclosure of 
basic financial information 
for each year in existence 
and as many as four years 
of estimated finances105  
No disclosure 
required106 
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years.109 
The lack of financial information is troubling, but the most galling 
omission is the Streamlined Application’s failure to require any actual 
copies of the applicant’s organizational documents. Without these 
documents, the applicant does not prove to the IRS (or to any individual 
who might request a copy of the Streamlined Application) that the 
organization is formed for permissible charitable purposes.110 There is an 
attestation, but no actual proof of compliance with the statutory 
requirement that an organization is formed exclusively for charitable 
purposes.111 For example, the law requires charities to have an 
organizational restriction against engaging in transactions that amount to 
private benefit or inurement.112 The Streamlined Application fulfills this 
requirement with a mere attestation and no requirement of providing 
proof of such prohibition, while the Form 1023 requires copies of the 
applicant’s organizational documents and specific references to the 
required provisions.113 Finally, to ensure that charity leaders are not able 
to raise money and simply dissolve the charity before pocketing the 
donations, the law requires a promise to distribute any funds upon 
dissolution in accordance with charitable laws.114 Without a requirement 
to submit organizational documents, there is no way to prove 
compliance with these legal requirements. 
For those that practice outside of the nonprofit field, these complaints 
might seem unduly pedantic—but these restrictions represent the core 
requirements for obtaining charitable status: the organizational and 
operational tests. The organizational test is designed to ensure that 
charitable applicants have provisions in their formation documents that 
ensure continued charitable activity and restrict improper or discouraged 
activity.115 To meet this test, the applicant’s organizational documents 
“must limit the organization’s purposes to one or more of those [certain 
enumerated charitable purposes]116 and mustn’t expressly empower it to 
                                                     
109. See Form 1023, supra note 49, at 10, pt. IX (“Financial Data”).  
110. This is a core requirement of charities. See Organizational Test, supra note 73. 
111. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71. 
112. See IRS Pub. 557, supra note 40. 
113. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71. 
114. See IRS Pub. 557, supra note 40. 
115. See Organizational Test, supra note 73. As Professor Hopkins explains, “[a]n organization is 
organized exclusively for one or more tax-exempt, charitable purposes only if its articles of 
organization limit its purposes to one or more exempt purposes and do not expressly empower it to 
engage, other than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities that in themselves are not in 
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.” Hopkins, supra note 58, at 67–68. 
116. These purposes are religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, 
educational, fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals. See I.R.S. Pub. 557, supra note 40, at 21. 
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engage, other than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities 
that don’t further one or more of those purposes.”117 To the extent that 
the organizational test represents a bulwark against improper activities 
by nonprofits, one can easily see the objections to the Streamlined 
Application’s failure to require submission of organizational documents. 
The other major test for charities, the operational test, represents the 
IRS’s requirement that charities operate in a manner consistent with 
nonprofit law.118 Obviously, the application phase, which is concerned 
with the organization’s then-current fitness to be a charity and is rarely 
forward-looking, is a poor tool to determine whether or not an applicant 
meets the operational test.119 Indeed, to the extent the application phase 
considers anticipated activities, the reviewers are necessarily limited by 
the conjectural nature of the answers.120 Thus, the IRS does not rely 
upon the tax-exempt application to determine a particular organization’s 
fulfillment of the operational test. Rather, the IRS uses annual reports, 
which are monitoring tools more suited to measuring an organization’s 
ongoing activities. These tools are discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
B. The Monitoring Tool: The Annual Reporting Requirement 
Clearly, any reasonably rigorous regulatory regime charged with 
oversight of charities cannot end at the application phase. After all, the 
application process can only provide information about the 
organization’s then-current operations and any information related to 
future activities will be based upon best intentions.121 Further 
complicating matters, unlike taxable entities, charities are not required to 
submit annual tax returns which could conceivably provide financial 
information necessary for IRS scrutiny. 
To bridge this gap and to ensure that tax-exempt organizations 
operate in accordance with charitable laws—in other words, to ensure 
that the operational test is met—the IRS requires annual information 
                                                     
117. See id. at 24. 
118. See Operational Test – Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/operational-test-internal-revenue-
code-section-501c3 [https://perma.cc/J3FH-3YLZ]. 
119. But see Form 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt. IV (requiring the applicant to describe activities 
that may occur in the future). 
120. See id. 
121. See Matthew Rossman, Evaluating Trickle Down Charity, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1455, 1495 
(2014) (“There is no formal mechanism by which the organization must periodically reestablish the 
basis for its exempt status. Thus, most organizations are granted tax-exempt status on the basis of 
largely aspirational and non-specific projections about their programming and never again 
separately questioned about it.”). 
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returns.122 In conjunction with the tax-exempt application, these returns 
permit the IRS to regulate charities not only at the inception of the 
entity’s tax-exempt lifecycle with the Form 1023 or the Streamlined 
Application, but also on an annual basis thereafter. There are three 
annual information returns relevant to this discussion. The first two, 
which this Article dubs the “Traditional Monitoring Tools,” are known 
as the Form 990123 and Form 990-EZ,124 while the third is the Form 990-
N.125 The Traditional Monitoring Tools elicit a fairly robust amount of 
data, providing regulators some information that might help to determine 
if a charity is compliant with charitable laws. In this manner, these forms 
are roughly analogous to the Form 1023. The Form 990-N, on the other 
hand, is analogous to the Streamlined Application, in that it requires 
precious little disclosure and leaves the IRS with virtually no means of 
evaluating a charity’s activities. The three monitoring tools are discussed 
in more detail in the following sections. 
1. The Traditional Monitoring Tools 
The information required by an annual information return varies 
depending on the size of the charity. Generally speaking, the more 
money involved, the more disclosure and information will be required. 
For example, entities that have annual gross receipts over $200,000 or 
assets greater than or equal to $500,000 are required to submit a Form 
990, the most robust of the annual information returns, while Smaller 
Charities are permitted to submit less rigorous annual information returns.126 
The Form 990 provides “a realistic picture of the [charity] and its 
operations,” with the ultimate goal of “promoting compliance with the 
federal tax law.”127 More specifically, the Form 990 requires a fairly 
detailed account of the charity’s financial condition, including disclosure 
of gross income, expenses, disbursements, a balance sheet, total 
contributions received (including the names and address of certain 
contributors), and salaries paid.128 In addition to this financial 
                                                     
122. I.R.C. § 6033 (2012). 
123. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990: 
RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2018) [hereinafter Form 990], 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3VR-TYHK]. 
124. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-1150, FORM 990-EZ: 
SHORT FORM RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2018) [hereinafter Form 
990-EZ], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ez.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4KW-EB54]. 
125.  See Filing Requirements for Form 990-N, supra note 33. 
126. See Form 990, supra note 123. 
127. Hopkins, supra note 58, at 882. 
128. See Form 990, supra note 123. 
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information, a charity filing a Form 990 is required to submit narrative 
descriptions of its “three largest program services,”129 which must 
provide “specific measurements such as clients served, days of care 
provided, number of sessions or events held, or publications issued.”130 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the IRS is not the only audience 
for Form 990s. In addition to submission to the IRS, charities are 
required to make their Form 990s publicly available for inspection and 
copying.131 Thus, the IRS and the general public have the opportunity to 
scrutinize the activities of charities on an annual basis. 
One should expect to spend approximately eighty-five hours to 
complete the Form 990.132 Recognizing this burden, the IRS does not 
require all entities to complete the Form 990. Charities that have annual 
gross receipts between $50,000 and $200,000 and assets under 
$500,000—that is, slightly smaller charities—are required to complete a 
less rigorous annual information return, the Form 990-EZ. 
In comparison to the Form 990, the Form 990-EZ is significantly 
streamlined. It still requires the basic financial information and narrative 
descriptions required by the Form 990,133 but in the interest of saving 
time for smaller organizations, the Form 990-EZ does not elicit the 
Form 990’s level of detail.134 As a result, the IRS estimates that it should 
take about eleven-and-a-half hours to learn about the law and fourteen-
and-a-half hours to prepare the form,135 less than half the estimated time 
it takes for charities filing the Form 990. 
Thus, the annual information returns for large- and mid-sized charities 
(the Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, respectively) each require charities to 
provide some financial information and a narrative description of the 
charity’s activities for the previous year. And like the Form 990, 
charities that file the Form 990-EZ must make the information available 
                                                     
129. See Form 990, supra note 123, at 2, pt. III, l. 4.  
130. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 11283J, INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 11 (2019) [hereinafter 
Instructions for Form 990], www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4GD-Z63F]. 
131. See Public Disclosure and Availability of Exempt Organizations Returns and Applications: 
Documents Subject to Public Disclosure, IRS, www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/public-disclosure-
and-availability-of-exempt-organizations-returns-and-applications-documents-subject-to-public-
disclosure [http://perma.cc/5759-EZRE]. 
132. Per the Paperwork Reduction Act. See Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax, IRS (2018), https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990/ar02.html 
[https://perma.cc/DG68-W2PW]. 
133. See Form 990-EZ, supra note 125. 
134. See generally id. 
135. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 64888C, 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-EZ (2019) [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-EZ], 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990ez.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ9B-5YRT]. 
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to the general public, providing some level of transparency. For Smaller 
Charities, however, the annual reporting requirement is, to say the least, 
quite different. 
2. The Form 990-N 
The IRS does not require Smaller Charities to file either the Form 990 
or the Form 990-EZ, but instead requires the Form 990-N, or e-
Postcard.136 The information elicited by the e-Postcard is minimal. The 
form requires no detailed financial information, and there is no 
requirement for a narrative description of the activities of the charity. In 
fact, other than the aforementioned attestation, there is no information 
other than the charity’s name, address, website, and employer 
identification number, along with the name and address of a principal 





The utility of such a disclosure is questionable. Indeed, to even 
categorize the e-Postcard as “disclosure” is to stretch the meaning of the 
word. Other than contact information, the IRS cannot deduce anything 
                                                     
136. The alternative name for this form is quite descriptive, as the information is provided only 
online (charities may not submit physical versions) and the information elicited is minimal. See 
Hopkins, supra note 58. 
137. See THE BRONY THANK YOU FUND, http://www.bronythankyoufund.org/ 
[http://perma.cc/6LMP-A33M]. Please note that the reference to “related schedules” at the bottom 
of the form is a bit of a mystery, as the e-Postcard does not require any schedules. Id.  
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about the organization’s activities. To the extent it was designed to serve 
an ongoing monitoring function akin to the Traditional Monitoring 
Tools, one can only conclude that it failed. 
C. A Failure to Regulate 
The criticisms of the e-Postcard were easy to predict. As discussed in 
more detail at the end of this section, the e-Postcard’s lack of meaningful 
information renders the form virtually useless. Similarly, the criticisms 
of the Streamlined Application were equally unsurprising. The 
information gleaned by the Streamlined Application pales in comparison 
to the breadth of information culled by the Form 1023. This section will 
describe the crux of the criticisms of both the Streamlined Application 
and the e-Postcard, by first discussing the Streamlined Application’s 
failure to educate applicants before shifting to its inability to collect 
adequate information. The section will close with a (fittingly) brief 
discussion of the e-Postcard’s failure to monitor the activities of charities. 
1. A Failure to Educate 
Many of the criticisms of the Streamlined Application highlight that 
the Form 1023 played a significant role in educating applicants on the 
proper activities and conduct of charitable organizations.138 For example, 
by requiring an applicant to engage in the laborious process of 
completing the Narrative, the applicant is forced to consider the 
organization’s past, present, and planned activities in a critical 
manner.139 The applicant is not merely permitted to provide a rote 
description of the organization’s activities, but it must explain how each 
of the activities furthers a charitable purpose.140 In theory, this requires a 
critical evaluation of each of the applicant’s planned activities in light of 
permissible charitable purposes. In addition to the Narrative, the 
Form 1023 also asks organizations to provide current and projected 
financial information, which requires a thoughtful applicant to consider 
how much projects will cost and how the organization will raise such 
funds.141 Collectively, this amounts to a relatively strenuous process. 
Professor Bruce Hopkins argues that this difficult process is 
intentional.142 According to Hopkins, the prompts were drafted to spur 
                                                     
138. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Letter, supra note 89, at 2–3 (noting a nonprofit 
leader’s concern that the Form 1023-EZ lacks sufficient rigor to prepare a charity to succeed). 
139. See Form 1023, supra 49, at 2, pt. IV.  
140. See Instructions for Form 1023, supra note 51, at 8. 
141. See Form 1023, supra 49, at 9–10, pt. IX. 
142. Hopkins, supra note 58, at 802. 
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reflection and inspire thoughtful responses, because the Form 1023: 
involves far more than merely responding to the questions on a 
government form. It is a process not unlike the preparation of a 
prospectus for a business in conformity with securities law 
requirements. Every statement made in the application should be 
carefully considered . . . . Organizations that are entitled to tax-
exempt status have been denied recognition of exemption by the 
IRS, or at least have caused the process of gaining the 
recognition to be more protracted, because of unartful 
phraseologies in the application that motivated the agency to 
muster a case that the organization did not qualify for exemption.143 
In other words, the rigor of the Form 1023 serves an educational role. 
By challenging applicants to make the case that their charitable activities 
are worthy of tax-exemption, the Form 1023 weeds out applicants that 
are less-prepared. Applicants with little more than “half-baked plans and 
ideas” may be discouraged by the Form 1023.144 As one critic of the 
Streamlined Application noted, “[h]aving gone through the [Form 1023] 
application process with a museum I helped start, we were put through 
the ringer by the IRS which to some extent forced us to think through 
our plans (mission, vision, intent, how we would operate, etc.) 
ultimately, I believe, making us stronger.”145 Professor George Yin 
illustrates the educational deficit of the Streamlined Application by 
describing a “sincere but not well advised” hypothetical group of 
applicants.146 Yin imagines such applicants as they “pore over the few 
sentences in the instructions summarizing the private inurement and 
benefit doctrines and other familiar parts of the law.”147 Highlighting the 
inadequacy of the instructions, Yin rhetorically asks, “[h]ow are they, 
working on their own, going to complete their required attestations?”148 
One might plausibly argue that an uneducated pool of charities is 
acceptable if the IRS is vigilant in ensuring that only appropriate 
applicants ultimately receive tax-exempt status. But as discussed in the 
next section, the IRS is simply incapable of serving in this capacity 
because the Streamlined Application fails to elicit sufficient information 
                                                     
143. Id. 
144. See Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Letter, supra note 89, at 2–3. (“The [Form 1023] is 
overwhelming and is discouraging to some, but also a deterrent to those with only half-baked plans 
and ideas.”). 
145. Id. at 3. The concerns set forth in the National Council for Nonprofit’s letter were addressed 
point by point by Professor Manoj Viswanathan. See Viswanathan, supra note 21 at 96–99. 
146. Yin, supra note 3, at 268. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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to make such a determination.149 
2. A Failure to Assess 
Although the lack of an educational component represents a common 
theme of many criticisms, the direst warnings relate to the Streamlined 
Application’s failure to elicit sufficient information for the IRS to make 
an informed decision on an applicant’s merits.150 This aspect of the 
Streamlined Application has been derisively referred to as the charitable 
application’s equivalent of “don’t ask, don’t tell.”151 Critics expressed 
concern that this failure paves the way for the IRS to award charitable 
status to entities that should not qualify.152 
The critics’ fears may be well-founded. At least one study supports 
the notion that the Streamlined Application may result in the IRS 
awarding charitable status to unfit entities.153 Nina Olson, the National 
Taxpayer Advocate,154 engaged a study in conjunction with the IRS to 
assess the success of the Streamlined Application.155 The study required 
additional disclosures for over 400 organizations that submitted a 
Streamlined Application.156 The additional requested information 
included “the organizing document with language required to meet the 
organizational test; a detailed description of past, present, and future 
activities; revenues and expenses; and a detailed description of any 
transactions with donors or related entities.”157 In other words, these 
organizations were asked to provide much of the information they would 
have been required to submit under the traditional Form 1023. 
The results of the study are disheartening. As Jill MacNabb, an 
advisor to the National Taxpayer Advocate, noted, “there is a significant 
difference in the approval rate of a [Streamlined Application] just as it is 
                                                     
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. See Cohen, supra note 21. 
152. See Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Letter, supra note 89. 
153. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–32 (2015), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46RG-9HZC] (“Study of Taxpayers That Obtained Recognition As IRC 
§ 501(c)(3) Organizations on the Basis of Form 1023-EZ.”). 
154. The National Taxpayer Advocate is an independent organization within the IRS that serves 
as an advocate for taxpayers who are experiencing delays or are suffering economic harm. See 
generally TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/ [https://perma.cc/9X86-
PB9X]. 
155. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2016 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 68, 
at 70–76. 
156. Id. 
157. See id. at 73.  
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and the approval rate when you ask for some very basic information.”158 
Although 95% of all Streamlined Application filers are ultimately 
approved, only 73% of the applications in the study were ultimately 
granted charitable status.159 Although based upon a small sample size, 
the rational conclusion is that the IRS is providing charitable status to 
entities that would not have qualified had they been required to submit 
the Form 1023.160 Or, in the words of the National Taxpayer Advocate, 
the IRS granted tax-exemption for “applications it would have rejected 
had the applications been subject to the slightest scrutiny.” 
Another study by the National Taxpayer Advocate provides additional 
reason for concern. This study set out to review the organizational 
documents of Streamlined Application filers to determine if the 
documents complied with IRS’s organizational test—in other words, if 
the charter and bylaws: (1) limited the organization’s activities to one or 
more exempt purpose; (2) did not expressly empower the organization to 
engage (other than insubstantially) activities which are not in furtherance 
of such purpose(s); and (3) ensured that assets are properly distributed 
upon dissolution.161 Because the Streamlined Application does not 
require submission of organizational documents, the IRS relies upon 
attestations of the existence of such provisions.162 Of the 408 
Streamlined Application filers in this study, all of which received 
charitable status,163 37% failed to comply with the organizational test.164 
In other words, these applicants obtained charitable status despite the 
fact that a brief review of their organizational documents would have 
                                                     
158. Fred Stokeld, Taxpayer Advocate Official Concerned About EO Short Form, TAX NOTES, 
Oct. 5, 2015, at 39.  
159. Id. 
160. This author is in the process of conducting a more robust study of Streamlined Application 
Filers to determine the veracity of this conclusion. 
161. See ORGANIZATIONAL TEST – INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 501(C)(3), 
https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Organizational-Test-
Internal-Revenue-Code-Section-501(c)(3) [https://perma.cc/66FN-VAT3]. Note that organizations 
in some states can meet the dissolution requirement without a specific provision. The study took this 
factor into account.  
162. See FORM 1023-EZ, supra note 66. Under the Form 1023, the applicants must not only 
provide copies of the organizational documents, but also indicate precisely where the provisions 
appear in such documents. See FORM 1023, supra note 49, at 2, pt. III. 
163. The small number of applicants reviewed is because the inquiry was limited to those states 
that provide copies of organizational documents free of charge. See also supra note 160 regarding 
the author’s plan to conduct a more robust study. 
164. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. The National Taxpayer 
Advocate, Nina Olson, concludes that “there were organizations that have been approved that if we 
had just simply asked four questions we would not have approved them today.” See David van den 
Berg, Olson: Exemption Applicants Are Being Wrongly Approved, TAX NOTES, Apr. 27, 2015, at 
396.  
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revealed their obvious deficiency.165 Even in such a small sample size, 
this is particularly worrisome and gives credence to claims that the 
Streamlined Application is not properly vetting applicants.166 
By way of example, the articles of incorporation of one of the entities 
in the study contained the following charitable purpose: 
My father . . . sufferred [sic] a spinal cord injury in February 2013, 
which left him a quadriplegic [sic]. His physicians and physical 
therapists say he is capable of recovering and walking again but his 
insurance . . . will not cover the expense, so we are hosting 
fundraisers/benefits to try to raise money on our own to pay for his 
therapy out of pocket.167 
Of course, one has sympathy for any person trying to raise money for an 
injured family member. But however sympathetic, this purpose is not a 
sufficient mission for a charity.168 Charitable organizations are required 
to have a public, as opposed to a private, charitable purpose.169 Raising 
money for an individual, regardless of the need, does not meet this 
standard.170 
Another example provides more alarming proof of the IRS’s inability 
to properly vet Streamlined Application filers. One organization 
received charitable status despite having a grossly insufficient 
dissolution provision.171 The provision read as follows: “[a]ssets will be 
distributed to [the founder] if this nonprofit dissolves.”172 In other words, 
the organizational documents permitted the incorporator to solicit tax-
deductible contributions, engage in no charitable work, dissolve the 
organization, and pocket any funds raised. This clearly violates the 
requirement that organizations dedicate all assets to a charitable 
purpose,173 and would hopefully give rise to scrutiny by state authorities 
and the IRS. However, even if authorities were able to catch this 
                                                     
165. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 38 (alterations in original). 
168. Andrew Megosh et al., 2001 EO CPE,  H. PRIVATE BENEFIT UNDER IRC 501(C)(3) 135 
(2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J45-PGYQ] (noting that 
“an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for exempt purposes unless it serves a 
public rather than a private interest”). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
172. Id. 
173. Elizabeth Ardoin, ORGANIZATIONAL TEST – IRC 501(C)(3) in 2004 EO CPE TEXT 10 (2004), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicd04.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAU8-HM5D] (“An organization 
will not qualify for exemption unless its creating document contains a dissolution provision that 
permanently dedicates its assets to an exempt purpose.”). 
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activity, the fact that the Streamlined Application does not permit the 
IRS to review organizational documents casts serious doubt on this 
tool’s ability to properly assess applicants. 
Thus, there is convincing evidence to conclude that the Streamlined 
Application does not elicit enough information to allow the IRS to 
adequately review applications. However, some critics go further, 
suggesting that the Streamlined Application is not merely providing 
inadequate information for assessment, but that the IRS is engaging in 
virtually no assessment.174 Citing a “high-ranking agency official,” Yin 
proffers that, with the Streamlined Application, “the IRS has effectively 
created a self-certification process to obtain (c)(3) status.”175 Yin does 
not simply argue that the information elicited by the Streamlined 
Application is inadequate; rather he argues that the information is 
nonexistent.176 Yin questions whether the Streamlined Application’s 
“series of completely opaque attestations” provides the IRS with 
anything to “screen and analyze.”177 
Perhaps we might find some comfort in the belief that the applicants 
cited above were unintentionally filing noncompliant organizational 
documents. One might reasonably assume that most people starting 
charities aspire to follow the law, and they would not intentionally leave 
out a required provision in its charter documents in order to either 
engage in non-charitable activity or distribute assets in contravention of 
501(c)(3) requirements upon dissolution. However, critics maintain that 
the Streamlined Application may open the door to more insidious 
actors.178 Such critics are concerned that the lack of rigor in the 
Streamlined Application will make “it easier for ‘scam’ charities to 
obtain tax-exempt status,” and that it shifts “IRS oversight obligations 
onto the public, the funding community, and state charity regulators.”179 
Although recognizing the notion that the “long-established Form 1023 
and application process need review and streamlining,”180 the National 
                                                     
174. See Yin, supra note 3, at 267. 
175. Id. at 267–68 (citing Fred Stokeld et. al., IRS Hearing on EO Guidance Expected in Spring, 
TAX NOTES, Mar. 10, 2014, at 1078). 
176. Id. 
177.  Id. at 269. 
178. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION 
WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 32 
(2014) (noting that by “decreasing the quality of information the IRS needs to make informed 
decisions about granting tax-exempt status” the Form 1023-EZ is “making it easier for ‘scam’ 
charities to obtain tax-exempt status”). 
179. Id. 
180. Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Letter, supra note 89, at 1. 
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Council of Nonprofits181 also expressed “serious concerns” about the 
Streamlined Application, warning that potential “bad actors will . . . opt 
to use the [Streamlined Application’s] express-lane approval process to 
avoid the transparency mandate that is integral to the current Form 1023 
application process.”182 
In sum, if the inaccurate attestations were intentional, then the 
Streamlined Application’s lack of rigor invites fraud. If the inaccurate 
attestations were unintentional, then the Streamlined Application is 
failing to properly educate applicants. In either case, the criticism that 
the IRS is not adequately assessing applicants carries considerable 
weight.183 As noted by the National Taxpayer Advocate, with the 
adoption of the Streamlined Application, “the IRS effectively abdicated 
its responsibility to determine whether an organization is organized and 
operated for an exempt purpose.”184 
3. No Monitoring of Smaller Charities 
The IRS argues that any perceived insufficiency of the application 
process is irrelevant because the IRS hopes to implement rigorous and 
effective monitoring procedures.185 This argument makes sense. If 
limited resources make it impossible to both adequately screen and 
monitor charities, then perhaps a shift of resources to the back end is 
justified. However, this argument loses all credibility when one 
examines the back-end monitoring tool for Smaller Charities, the e-
Postcard.186 As noted above, the e-Postcard provides virtually no 
financial information other than an opaque attestation that the 
organization’s “[g]ross receipts are normally $50,000 or less,”187 and it 
demands absolutely no description of the charity’s activities. Beyond 
providing contact information, the document is virtually useless. 
                                                     
181. The National Council of Nonprofits represents the “largest network of nonprofits in the 
country.” Viswanathan, supra note 21, at 95. 
182. Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Letter, supra note 89,  at 7. “Likewise, the Taxpayer Advocate 
also raised concerns about the streamlined 1023-EZ form, including a lack of empirical data 
demonstrating that organizations anticipating less than $50,000 in gross annual receipts pose low 
risks to compliance, a failure to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of downstream consequences 
of the streamlined application, and a post-implementation plan . . . to correct potential compliance 
problems.” GAO-15-164, supra note 178, at 32. 
183. See id. 
184. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 36. 
185. IRS Press Release, supra note 14. 
186. See Rossman, supra note 121, at 1494 (2014) (“IRS scrutiny of 501(c)(3) organizations is 
heavily front-loaded.”). 
187. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (showing an example of a completed Form 990-
N).  
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Thus, if an organization attests that its gross receipts will not exceed 
$50,000, it will operate in a regulatory blind spot. At the outset of the 
organization’s charitable existence, the IRS requests the scant 
information required by the Streamlined Application. Thereafter, the IRS 
annually requests the meager information required by the e-Postcard. 
Considering the Streamlined Application and the e-Postcard together, 
the IRS has effectively given up either prospective or retrospective 
review of Smaller Charities. 
II. THE HARMS OF UNREGULATED CHARITY 
The only defensible argument for the IRS’s failure to screen or 
monitor Smaller Charities is that they present no appreciable risk of 
harm.188 The argument must hold that, by dint of the organization’s size, 
the potential harms are similarly small. This appears to be the position of 
the IRS,189 but the argument does not stand to reason. In fact, the 
potential for Smaller Charities to engage in widespread noncompliance 
presents a series of harms. From the micro-level perspective, individual 
Smaller Charities may engage in a number of prohibited or disfavored 
activities that harm donors, market participants, and charitable 
beneficiaries.190 On a macro-level, any widespread impermissible 
activities by Smaller Charities might inspire a collective distrust of the 
charitable sector, ultimately undercutting the nonprofit sector’s 
effectiveness. 
A. Driven by the Bottom Line 
Although the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code appears to 
prohibit charitable organizations from engaging in any activities other 
than those specifically enumerated in the statute, the reality is quite 
different. The Internal Revenue Code states, in facially uncompromising 
language, that “to be exempt as an organization described in 501(c)(3), 
an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one 
or more purposes specified in such section.”191 Such enumerated 
                                                     
188. See Yin, supra note 3 at 4 (“Implicit in [Commissioner Koskinen’s] claim about small 
organizations appears to be the sense that their exemption costs the fisc very little, and thus the 
effect of any mistaken determinations will be de minimis.”). 
189. See IRS Press Release, supra note 14, at 1 (quotation omitted).  
190. Lloyd H. Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of 
Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 49, 85 (2012) (“The term ‘beneficiaries’ in the charity context refers 
to those who benefit gratuitously from a charity’s activities, as distinguished from consumers who 
pay full fair market value for the goods or services they receive from a charity . . . .”). 
191. Organizations Organized and Operated for Religious, Charitable, Scientific, Testing for 
Public Safety, Literary, or Educational Purposes, or for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children or 
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purposes are religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, educational, or preventing cruelty to children or animals.192 A 
reasonable interpretation of this edict would conclude that charities are 
not permitted to engage in any activity, however insignificant in amount 
or character, that fails to fall within the activities contemplated by the 
enumerated purposes.193 Such is the plain meaning of “exclusively.”194 
However, the regulatory regime takes a permissible stance on a number 
of activities that seem, for lack of a better word, uncharitable. In this 
manner, charities may engage in a range of activities outside the scope 
of the enumerated charitable purposes. 
By permitting charities to engage in such activities, the regulatory 
regime runs the risk of condoning behavior that may, to some, appear 
antithetical to any reasonable definition of charity.195 More to the point, 
without running afoul of the regulatory regime, charity leaders often 
earn handsome salaries,196 some of our most cherished public charities 
are major participants in the private market,197 and many charities charge 
fees for the charitable services they provide.198 Such activities are not, on 
their face, offensive, but they are also certainly not necessarily 
“religious, charitable, scientific, [related to] testing for public safety, 
literary, educational, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”199 
Because an excess of such activities would be unacceptable, the 
regulatory regime developed limits on the amount and character of such 
activities. These limits suggest a regulatory aversion to such activities, 
recognizing that unreasonably lavish salaries, excessive commercial 
activity, and prohibitively high fees for charitable services would 
transform an organization’s activities from selfless to self-serving, 
lessening the justification for favorable tax treatment.200 Too much of 
                                                                                                                      
Animals, 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2019) (emphasis added). 
192. Id. 
193. John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 487, 496 (2002). 
194. See generally id. 
195. Dean Baker, End Bloated Salaries in the Nonprofit Sector, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., 
Spring 2019, at 58 (“The federal government is providing enormous subsidies to the bloated pay of 
top executives at nonprofits. This is simply not a good use of federal dollars, and it is hardly in 
keeping with the idea that nonprofits should be serving a public purpose.”). 
196. See id.; Andrea Fuller, Charity Officials are Increasingly Receiving Million-Dollar Paydays, 
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-officials-are-increasingly-
receiving-million-dollar-paydays-1488754532 [https://perma.cc/G8SF-SJAL]. 
197. See generally Colombo, supra note 193. 
198. See generally Lloyd H. Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-
First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480 (2010). 
199. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i) (2019). 
200. Cf. Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH L. REV. 999, 
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any such activities will result in excise taxes or even revocation of tax-
exempt status.201 Given that the regulatory regime places limitations on 
paying salaries, engaging in commerce, and charging fees for charitable 
services, this Article will refer to them as “Disfavored Activities.” 
This section will start by discussing a Disfavored Activity for which 
the regulatory regime has fashioned a partial monitoring tool: the 
commercial activity of charities. In short, charities are required to 
disclose “unrelated business income” of more than $1,000 in any given 
year.202 Income is “unrelated” if it is derived from a regularly carried on 
trade or business that is not substantially related to furthering the 
charity’s exempt purpose.203 Such income is subject to taxes and 
reporting. By requiring disclosure of such unrelated business income, 
regardless of an entity’s size, the regime capably monitors unacceptable 
amounts and types of this particular commercial activity. However, as 
described in more detail below, the existing regime does not monitor 
related commercial activity in an acceptable manner.204 Since related 
commercial activity may also undercut public faith in the charitable 
sector, the inability of the regulatory regime to monitor related 
commercial activity represents a regulatory failure. 
After discussing the commercial activity of charities, the remainder of 
this section discusses two Disfavored Activities for which the regulatory 
regime has yet to fashion an acceptable monitoring tool: paying salaries 
and charging fees for charitable services. As this section will argue, the 
monitoring mechanisms in place to measure such activities are woefully 
inadequate for Smaller Charities. 
1. The Market and Charities: Limited Commercial Activity 
It might come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with the charitable 
sector to learn that charities may, and often do, engage in commerce.205 
This surprise is no doubt due to the fact that an act of commerce, a quid 
pro quo exchange, may very well be the antithesis of what most people 
                                                                                                                      
1021 n.51 (1982) (“It has also been said that the core feature of charity is that it is not ‘self-
regarding,’ but ‘other-regarding.’”). 
201. See PUB 557, supra note 40. 
202. See infra notes 216–219. 
203. See Unrelated Business Income Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/unrelated-business-income-tax [perma.cc/H5ZN-3DYD] (last updated Mar. 26, 2019). For 
example, if a church takes advantage of its proximity to a college football stadium by charging for 
parking space on Saturdays, the church is realizing income that is completely unrelated to its faith-
based mission. 
204. See infra notes 216–219. 
205. See Colombo, supra note 193, at 489–90. 
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think of when they think of charities.206 Visions of soup kitchens and 
homeless shelters echo widely accepted definitions of charitable 
organizations as those “set up to provide help and raise money for those 
in need,” or entities dedicated to “the voluntary giving of help, typically 
in the form of money, to those in need.”207 If the very definition of 
charity is “voluntary giving,” then a commercial transaction in which 
one party exchanges money for the services or goods of another 
certainly does not qualify.208 Indeed, if one is giving something in 
exchange for something else, one wonders if anything is “given” at all. 
The instinct that charities should not engage in commercial activity 
finds some support in the Internal Revenue Code.209 As noted above, the 
Internal Revenue Code purports to limit activities of charities 
“exclusively” to certain enumerated purposes. Professor John Colombo 
argues that a plain reading of this provision would prohibit any amount 
of commercial activity “in no uncertain terms.”210 However, as Colombo 
concedes, this language “has almost never been interpreted literally”211 
and that, with respect to commercial activity, the definition of 
“exclusively” has been held to mean something akin to “mostly.”212 
Ultimately, the regulatory regime has concluded that so long as “no[t] 
more than an insubstantial part” of a particular charity’s activity is 
engaged in something other than one of the enumerated charitable 
purposes, the charity is deemed to be operated “exclusively” for 
charitable purposes.213 This generous interpretation permits commercial 
activity. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common for charities to 
engage in such activity.214 
The amount and degree of commerciality that is permissible for 
charities has been crafted for over nearly a century by courts and the 
IRS, resulting in a number of tests.215 For commercial activity that is 
related to the charity’s mission, charities may engage in unlimited 
                                                     
206. Rob Atkinson, Tax Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic Underwrite de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy?, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1 (2014). 
207. Charity, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/charity 
[https://perma.cc/R5LQ-W8XR]. 
208. Id. 
209. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
210. Colombo, supra note 193, at 496. 
211. Id. 
212. Hopkins, supra note 58. 
213. Id. at 228.  
214. See Colombo, supra note 193, at 489 (“[I]t is now common to find charities engaged in 
numerous economic activities through a variety of business arrangements . . . .”). 
215. For a complete discussion of the history of commercial activity by 501(c)(3) organizations, 
see generally id.  
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amounts of commercial activity.216 A charity may also engage in a 
certain amount of commercial activity that is unrelated to its charitable 
purpose so long as the charity pays taxes on any revenues generated 
through such activities. This taxable revenue is known as unrelated 
business income, and if a charity incurs too much, then the charity 
jeopardizes its 501(c)(3) status. However, the test for what, precisely, 
constitutes an amount of unrelated business income that would 
jeopardize an organization’s tax-exempt status is not entirely clear. And 
like many of the restrictions on tax-exempt entities, the justification for 
the imposition of tax on unrelated business income is a bit muddled. 
Take, for example, Goodwill Industries.217 Goodwill’s mission is “to 
enhance people’s dignity and quality of life by strengthening 
communities, eliminating barriers to opportunity, and helping them 
reach their full potential through learning and the power of work.”218 
Because providing jobs is inherent in the mission of Goodwill, the 
income realized through the operation of used clothing stores is related. 
The justification for permitting such activity is based in pragmatism. If 
commercial activity is the byproduct of charitable activity, then any 
regulatory limit on such commercial activity might stifle the 
organization’s ability to meet its desired charitable activity. 
However, if a commercial activity is not related to the organization’s 
charitable purpose, then it is permissible only to the extent the activity 
does not constitute a substantial part of the organization’s activities.219 
Again, this regulatory leniency is driven by pragmatism. If one combines 
the inherent difficulty of raising money in the nonprofit sector by 
traditional means with the pervasiveness of commerciality in our culture, 
it would be unreasonable to place an absolute limit on commercial 
activity by nonprofits.220 To do so might limit the ability of nonprofits to 
flourish, with the concomitant reduction in positive charitable activity.221 
                                                     
216. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘unrelated trade or business’ [means] . . . any trade or 
business the conduct of which is not substantially related . . . to the exercise or performance by such 
organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its 
exemption under section 501 . . . .”). 
217. GOODWILL, https://www.goodwill.org [perma.cc/6NKX-2S5P]. 
218. About Us, GOODWILL, https://www.goodwill.org/about-us/ [perma.cc/JQ2V-3UZP]. 
219. Organizations Organized and Operated for Religious, Charitable, Scientific, Testing for 
Public Safety, Literary, or Educational Purposes, or for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children or 
Animals, 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(iii) (2019); see also, Rev. Rul. 69-279, 1969-1 C.B. 152; 
Rev. Rul. 69-256, 1969-1 C.B. 151. 
220. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 877 
(1980) (“Because nonprofits are unable to sell equity shares, they must rely largely upon donations, 
retained earnings, and debt for capital financing.”). 
221. See id. at 877 (noting that “while some institutions have accumulated endowments in excess 
of their needs, many others are sorely strapped for the capital funds necessary to meet the 
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The limitation on unrelated commercial activity has been crafted 
through decades of court decisions and IRS private letter rulings, 
resulting in complex and unclear guidance. One can imagine the 
difficulty of determining how a particular commercial activity is 
“related” to a particular charitable purpose. Is, for example, selling 
cookies (a clear commercial activity) related to the charitable purpose of 
the Girl Scouts? How is Goodwill’s sales of used clothing different from 
any other thrift store? Similarly, it is difficult to determine if a particular 
commercial activity makes up a “substantial” portion of an 
organization’s operations. The Supreme Court noted that a single non-
exempt purpose, if substantial, is impermissible.222 In this manner, a 
nonprofit organization that planned to promote community organizing in 
a coffee shop was deemed non-charitable because the organization’s  
“primary activity consists of operating a commercial coffeehouse.”223 
But where is the line? If the Girl Scouts realize hundreds of millions of 
dollars in revenue for selling cookies, how much other activity must it 
engage in to render this amount “insubstantial?”224 What percentage of 
such activity qualifies as substantial?225 
It is important to appreciate the policy considerations that undergird 
the limitation of commercial activities by charities because these 
considerations lay bare the danger of the poor screening and monitoring 
mechanisms for charities.226 In other words, the policy considerations 
illustrate the potential harms of a regulatory regime that fails to identify 
impermissible amounts of commercial activity. While there are a number 
of concerns, including a commercial activity’s tendency to divert 
attention from charitable activities,227 the potential to create market 
                                                                                                                      
burgeoning demand for their services”).  
222. See Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (“In 
this instance, in order to fall within the claimed exemption, an organization must be devoted to 
educational purposes exclusively. This plainly means that the presence of a single non-educational 
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance 
of truly educational purposes.”). 
223. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-34-008 (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/201934008.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZC3-U3NH]. 
224. This is a trick question. Because Girl Scout Cookie sales are characterized as related 
activity, the organization may engage in unlimited amounts of such sales. 
225. See Rossman, supra note 121, at 90. In discussing the difficulty of discerning the limits and 
reach of the private benefit doctrine, which also uses the “substantial” limitations, Rossman notes, 
“[t]here is no fixed percentage for what constitutes insubstantiality.” Id.   
226. For a detailed discussion about commercial activity, see John Colombo, Why is Harvard 
Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 
ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 849 (1993). 
227. See Colombo, supra note 193, at 534. Colombo calls this the “diversion problem,” and 
explains that “[t]his argument views commercial activity by nonprofits as inherently bad because it 
diverts the attention of managers and resources away from the core charitable mission and core 
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inefficiencies,228 and charitable assets being subject to liabilities of the 
commercial activity,229 this Article will restrict the discussion to those 
concerns with the potential to have the greatest negative impact on the 
charitable sector. Colombo calls these considerations the “traditional” 
policy concerns: the twin fears of unfair competition and the erosion of 
the corporate tax base.230 
The unfair competition policy consideration has two prongs: 
predatory pricing and subsidized market expansion.231 The first 
consideration is obvious: tax-exempt organizations that engage in 
commercial activity might have an unfair competitive advantage over 
for-profit actors because charities do not have to pay taxes.232 The 
concern is that charities may leverage their tax savings to engage in 
predatory pricing.233 After all, once a charity is relieved of the burden of 
paying taxes on a commercial activity, it may use those savings to price 
its goods or services lower than for-profit entities, thereby engaging in 
unfair competition.234 The second consideration, subsidized market 
expansion, reflects “the possibility that an exempt organization will 
unfairly expand market share by using its tax savings to reinvest in its 
commercial activity.”235 When a charity engages in subsidized market 
expansion, rather than using tax-savings to cut prices of services or 
goods, a charity might employ the savings to expand its commercial 
activity.236 Thus, charities have access to a source of money (the money 
that would have been spent on taxes) that is unavailable to for-profit 
competitors.237 Although many commentators have noted that there is no 
evidence that charities engage in either predatory pricing or subsidized 
                                                                                                                      
charitable outputs.” Id. 
228. See id. at 538 (“[T]hese issues revolve around whether an exempt charity’s operation of a 
commercial activity creates inefficiencies in the capital markets or the distribution of goods and 
services that would not result from competition by for-profits only or if nonprofits concentrated 
their resources solely on production of charitable outputs.”). 
229. Id. at 545 (“There certainly is a legitimate public interest in ensuring that charitable assets, 
the creation of which has been at least partially subsidized by tax-exemption, are not squandered in 
the operation of noncharitable businesses.”). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 530 (“An example would be a sort of ‘predatory pricing’ in which an exempt 
organization prices its product below its competitors because it does not have to recoup the costs of 
taxation.” (citing Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 
75 VA. L. REV. 605, 610 (1989))). 
233. Id. 
234. Id.  
235. Id. 
236. Id.  
237. Id. 
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market expansion,238 the fear of unfair competition remains one of the 
core reasons for the imposition of limits on the commercial activity of 
charities.239 
The other traditional policy consideration is the effect on the tax base. 
Stated plainly, critics are worried that the United States is foregoing 
potential revenue by failing to tax the activities of charities.240 This 
concern has intuitive appeal, and “it is not overly cynical to suggest that 
some members of Congress would be willing to cede parts of the 
formerly exempt nonprofit sector to for-profit firms in return for the 
tribute of additional tax revenue.”241 Perhaps this is because the 
nonprofit sector makes up a significant portion of the American 
economy, reporting $2.26 trillion in gross revenues and $5.17 trillion in 
assets in 2013.242 The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates 
that this amounted to approximately 5% of America’s gross domestic 
product.243 Although these numbers are impressive, one should exercise 
caution in using them to try to calculate income that might be taxed 
under a hypothetical regime that taxed charities. This is because tax-
                                                     
238. Id. (“In fact, legal academics and economists who have examined the issue have reached an 
almost remarkable consensus that unfair competition in the form of predatory pricing or predatory 
market expansion simply is not a serious policy concern.” (citing Boris I. Bittker & George K. 
Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 
299, 318–25 (1976); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income 
Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 613 (1989); William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 
UCLA L. REV. 13, 61–68 (1972); Susan Rose-Ackermann, Unfair Competition and Corporate 
Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1036–39 (1982); Richard Steinberg, “Unfair” 
Competition by Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 351, 354–55 (1991))).  
239. See Colombo, supra note 193, at 530 (concluding that “even though unfair competition was 
the primary rationale for enacting the UBIT, it in fact may not be a very serious policy concern in 
practice”). 
240. See J. Bennett & G. Rudney, A Commerciality Test to Resolve the Commercial Nonprofit 
Issue, TAX NOTES 1095–98 (Sept. 14, 1987) (arguing, in part, that organizations that receive more 
than 50% of their revenue from commercial activity should not be deemed tax-exempt). 
Interestingly, for the purposes of this Article, Bennett and Rudney also argue that any commercial 
activity which is priced significantly below cost to targeted individuals should not be considered 
commercial. Id.; see also, Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the 
Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991) (arguing that contributions should make 
up one third of the gross revenue of charities). 
241. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 507–08 
(1990). 
242. This number represents reporting nonprofits, and only accounts for 35% of the nonprofit 
organizations registered with the IRS. BRICE S. MCKEEVER, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
IN BRIEF 2018: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING, 
http://nccs.urban.org/publication/nonprofit-sector-brief-2018#the-nonprofit-sector-in-brief-2018-
public-charities-giving-and-volunteering [perma.cc/NY5Q-HCL3]. Importantly, note that this 
number does not include Smaller Charities since the reporting requirements are to scant as to render 
such data impossible to deduce. Id.  
243. See GAO-15-164, supra note 178, at 1.  
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exempt entities have no incentive to engage in tax planning, and the 
cumulative revenue and assets of charities would no doubt look very 
different if they were subject to taxes.244 Regardless of the actual impact, 
policymakers have expressed concern that our country is foregoing 
substantial revenues by bestowing tax-exemption on charities.245 
This concern led to the imposition of a tax on income derived from 
certain commercial activities of charities.246 As noted above, charities 
are permitted to engage in an insubstantial amount of commercial 
activity that is unrelated to the entity’s charitable purpose.247 However, 
such income is subject to taxation, known as the unrelated business 
income tax.248 To the extent a charity engages in “a trade or business” 
that is “regularly carried on” and “is not substantially related to the 
charitable, educational, or other purpose that is the basis of the 
organization’s exemption,” the charity must pay taxes on that activity.249 
In this manner, the regulatory regime limits the amount of permissible 
commercial activity of a charity that is not related to its charitable purpose. 
But such limitations would be irrelevant if there were no means to 
monitor the commercial activities of charities. If neither the public nor 
the regulatory agency knows the amount and character of a charity’s 
commercial activity, the restrictions on unrelated commercial activity 
would be meaningless. Fortunately, the regulatory regime has developed 
a mechanism for charities to self-report unrelated business income: the 
Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return, or the Form 990-
T.250 This form is required to be filed by any charity with gross income 
of $1,000 or more from a regularly conducted unrelated trade or 
business.251 Note that there is no gross receipts limitation, so all 
charities, even Smaller Charities, are required to file the Form 990-T if 
they have more than $1,000 of unrelated business income.252 And just 
                                                     
244. For example, if tax-exempt entities were subject to federal taxes, a rational charity would 
use mechanisms like tax shelters to lower its tax burden. See generally Mihir A. Desai, The 
Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income, 17 TAX POL’Y ECON. 169 (2003) (discussing 
the use of tax shelters, a mechanism some corporations use to lower their tax burden). 
245. Colombo, supra note 193, at 532 (noting that “tax base protection was [a] major concern of 
Congress” when it opted to tax certain commercial activity of nonprofits). 
246. Id. 
247. See IRS Pub. 557, supra note 40. 
248. See Unrelated Business Income Tax, IRS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/unrelated-business-income-tax [perma.cc/H5ZN-3DYD]. 
249. Id. 
250. See EXEMPT ORGANIZATION BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURN, FORM 990-T, 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990t.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC8L-E92P]. 
251. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(e) (2019). 
252. See FORM 990-T, supra note 250. 
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like the Forms 990 and 990-EZ, the Form 990-T is a public document, 
allowing both the IRS and the general public to scrutinize the unrelated 
commercial activities of charities.253 
The Form 990-T is not used to record related commercial activity. If 
an organization is required to file a Form 990 or 990-EZ, it must provide 
an accounting of its “program service revenue,” which would include 
revenue derived from related commercial activity.254 The IRS and the 
general public, therefore, have the means of scrutinizing the related 
commercial activity of mid-sized and larger charities. This is simply not 
the case with Smaller Charities, which are required only to file the e-
Postcard. Thus, IRS does not adequately monitor related commercial 
activity for Smaller Charities, which allows Smaller Charities to hide 
any related commercial activity behind a cloak of regulatory 
indifference. It is true that unrelated business income is captured through 
the requirement of the Form 990-T, so to the extent unrelated business 
income is at issue, an entity claiming unfair competition has the tools to 
identify the bad actors, and the IRS has the means to identify and 
address unfair competition by taxing the activity.255 But if the threat lies 
in a Smaller Charity’s related commercial activity, there is no means of 
tracking such activity by harmed parties or the IRS. This is, therefore, an 
example of a Disfavored Activity for which the regulatory regime has 
developed a partial monitoring mechanism: the regime measures 
unrelated commercial activity but fails to adequately monitor related 
commercial activity. For Smaller Charities, this is the only Disfavored 
Activity discussed in this Article for which the regime has developed 
any monitoring tools. 
2. The Price of Charity: Reasonable Salaries 
In 2010, Congress withheld over $400 million in federal grants from 
the Boys & Girls Clubs of America.256 The rejection was not due to 
some scandal, a change in grantmaking priorities, or any illegality on the 
part of the charity. Rather, a number of senators blanched when they 
learned that the organization paid their CEO almost a million dollars a 
year.257 The fact that the CEO received a salary was not the sticking 
point for the lawmakers, but it struck many as unseemly for the salary to 
                                                     
253. Id. 
254. See FORM 990, supra note 123, at pt. I, l.2. 
255. See FORM 990-T, supra note 250. 
256. Stephanie Strom, Lawmakers Seeking Cuts Look at Nonprofit Salaries, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/us/27nonprofit.html [perma.cc/YPA2-HJD8]. 
257. Id. 
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be so high.258 Ken Berger, the president of Charity Navigator, argued 
that it defied “common sense” that “those working for the benefit of the 
neediest people in our society should make millions and multimillions 
like corporate leaders.”259 The message from Congress was clear: a 
charity may pay a salary, but it has to be reasonable. As succinctly stated 
by Senator Tom Coburn, “A nearly $1 million salary . . . for a nonprofit 
executive is not only questionable on its face but also raises questions 
about how the organization manages its finances in other areas.”260 
To some, the fact that the charities can pay salaries at all is 
surprising,261 let alone the fact that many charity executives enjoy 
handsome compensation packages that rival salaries paid in the for-
profit realm.262 Such surprise might be justified by a plain reading of the 
statutory private inurement prohibition, which requires charities to 
ensure that no part of the “net earnings inure in whole or in part to the 
benefit of private shareholders or individuals.”263 A reasonable 
interpretation of this language would prohibit any compensation. Indeed, 
it is hard to conceive of a salary as anything other than giving a portion 
of the “net earnings” of a charity to “private . . . individuals.”264 
However, the plain meaning of the Internal Revenue Code is not 
controlling, and charities may pay salaries to employees to the extent 
that the salaries are reasonable.265 Reasonableness is determined by 
examining both the assets of the organization and the absolute amount of 
the salary, as compared to salaries paid by similar organizations. 266 
The justification for permitting reasonable salaries, similar to the 
approach to commercial activity by charities, appears to be pragmatic. In 
terms of legislative history, lawmakers noted that those working for 
charities “need not necessarily accept reduced compensation merely 




261. See DARRYL K. JONES ET AL., THE TAX LAW OF CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 257 (3d ed., 2014) (“Perhaps the one assumption most associated with tax 
exemption, by laypersons and scholars alike, is that those who conduct charitable activities are not 
in it for the money.”). 
262. See Fuller, supra note 196.  
263. Organizations Organized and Operated for Religious, Charitable, Scientific, Testing for 
Public Safety, Literary, or Educational Purposes, or for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children or 
Animals, 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2019). 
264. Id. 
265. Hopkins, supra note 58, at 513 (“A tax-exempt organization . . . can, of course, make 
ordinary and necessary expenditures in furtherance of its operations without forfeiting its exempt 
status. This includes the payment of compensation for services rendered, whether to an employee or 
to a vendor, consultant, or other independent contractor.”). 
266. Id. at 514–15.  
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because he or she renders services to a tax-exempt, as opposed to a 
taxable, organization.”267 Equating salaries paid to employees of 
charities to those of for-profit entities recognizes the reality that the 
labor pool is not artificially divided between the profit-seeking sector 
and the charitable sector. The clear implication is that nonprofits might 
have difficulty attracting quality employees if they were not permitted to 
pay comparable salaries. This legislative concern is echoed in case law, 
with one court noting that the law “places no duty on individuals 
operating charitable organizations to donate their services; they are 
entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts.”268 
One should, however, be careful not to draw too many conclusions 
from these statements because the ability of charities to pay salaries and 
the requirement that such salaries be “reasonable” was enshrined into 
law with little debate.269 With respect to the private inurement 
prohibition—itself an “elusive, elastic, and evolving theory rather than a 
safely articulated standard”270—the fact that charities may pay salaries 
stands as an anomalous exception. Further, although legislative 
history271 and some courts272 suggest that salaries for charities’ 
employees ought to receive no extra scrutiny, the fact remains that 
salaries paid by charities are not unrestricted. This is in sharp contrast to 
salaries paid by for-profit organizations, which are under no such 
limitations.273 
Regardless of its genesis, the rule is fairly well-settled: salaries paid 
by charities must be reasonable in light of what comparable charities pay 
and with an eye toward the assets of the organization. In some ways, one 
might think of this rule as using reasonableness to measure the 
organization’s commitment to charitable work vis-á-vis self-interest. The 
justification for this limitation lies in the belief that excessive salaries 
strongly suggest that the organization is focused less on its charitable 
                                                     
267. H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, note 5 (1996). 
268. World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 969 (1983). 
269. Many of the rules governing charitable organizations have little theoretical foundation—
most were simply adopted from ancient English law without much comment or criticism. See 
Amarante, supra note 46. 
270. See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and 
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 581 (2000).  
271. H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, n.5 (1996). 
272. See World Family Corp., 81 T.C. at 969. 
273. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contractual 
Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1184–85 (2011) (“Currently, corporate law as it relates 
to executive compensation provides essentially no limits. Within the common law on the subject, all 
the cases point in one direction: more pay and on any terms to which managers can get boards to 
agree.”). 
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mission and more on enriching insiders.274 Thus, while the regulatory 
regime will permit some salaries, they must not get out of hand. So long 
as they are reasonable, the regime will assume the organization has 
acceptable priorities. 
Given the limitations on salaries, it stands to reason that the IRS’s 
monitoring tools must include some means for the agency to scrutinize 
and analyze the salaries paid by charities. As noted above, the Forms 
990 and 990-EZ require public disclosure of the salaries.275 These forms 
require “total salaries and wages paid to all officers and employees and 
payments made to directors and trustees,” including “all . . . forms of 
income and benefits received from the organization.”276 In this manner, 
any charity that is required to file a Form 990 or Form 990-EZ is forced 
to provide the raw data necessary for the IRS and the public to determine 
the reasonableness of the salaries. In other words, the monitoring tools 
for charities required to file such forms are sufficient to, in the very 
least, identify charities enriching their insiders. But if an organization is 
not required to file such forms, the only way the IRS can measure the 
reasonableness of salaries would be a direct audit, and the public has no 
way to determine salary levels. Thus, Smaller Charities, permitted to file 
the e-Postcard and relieved of the obligation to file either a Form 990 or 
990-EZ, operate outside of any regulatory tool capable of measuring the 
reasonableness of salaries. 
The resultant harms of this regulatory failure are obvious. A Smaller 
Charity, complying with every required disclosure, could take all 
organizational revenue and use it to pay salaries. Donors to the charity 
would have no means of discovering the fact that their donations did 
nothing other than enrich an insider. If the donor is driven by nothing 
other than the potential tax-deduction of the contribution, then the harm 
is only psychic, as the donor received the benefit of the donation (a 
lower personal tax burden). But what of the donors who give, but do not 
take a tax-deduction?277 In these cases, the donors cannot rely on the 
implicit promise of the charitable regime: if you give to a 501(c)(3) 
                                                     
274. Dean Baker, End Bloated Salaries in the Nonprofit Sector, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 
57, 57–58 (2019) (“As fans of arithmetic know, the more money that goes to the CEO and other top 
executives, the less money is available to pay people lower on the ladder. This means less pay for 
both midlevel workers and the lower-level workers who clean the bathrooms and serve the food. And in 
the case of nonprofits, it also means less money for the beneficiaries of the charity in question.”). 
275. See supra section I.B.1. 
276. See INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-EZ, supra note 135, at 15. 
277. Joseph Rosenburg et. al., The New Debate over a Charitable Deduction for Nonitemizers, 
URBAN INST., 5 (Oct. 2016), available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publica
tion/135446/the-new-ebate-over-a-charitable-deduction-fornonitemizers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KZ 
M-MWJ9]. The authors note that nonitemizers make up approximately 74% of total taxpayers and 
accounted for an estimated 18% of the total charitable giving. Id.  
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organization, the government will ensure that your donation is used to 
promote charitable activity.278 Therefore, to the extent a donor 
contributes to a charity to either support the charity’s mission or to enjoy 
the warm glow of being a generous person, the donor cannot rely upon a 
regulatory regime that does not adequately monitor potentially excessive 
salaries. 
3. Charging for Charity: Fees for Service 
As noted in the previous section, charities are permitted to engage in 
unlimited commercial activity that is related to the charity’s exempt 
purpose.279 Thus, the Girl Scouts may sell hundreds of millions of 
dollars’ worth of cookies280 under the justification that the cookie sales 
are related to its mission of “build[ing] girls of courage, confidence, and 
character.”281 Similarly, Harvard may charge each student tens of 
thousands of dollars for tuition without jeopardizing its tax-exempt 
status.282 However, while selling cookies may be the best way to build 
the character of young women, Harvard provides diplomas only to those 
willing and able to pay a handsome fee. Regardless of our comfort level 
with allowing commercial activity by charities, there is something 
especially troubling with charities charging fees in exchange for their 
charitable services. How can an activity constitute charity if the recipient 
pays for it? 
Although the IRS has carved out some exceptions, the general rule 
allows charities to charge reasonable fees for charitable services 
provided.283 In fact, the IRS is relatively dismissive of the concern, 
noting that the mere existence of fees for services “will be relevant in 
very few cases” and “when the community clearly benefits from an 
organization’s activities, a reasonable charge will usually not negate this 
benefit.”284 There does not appear to be a statutory basis for this 
approach.285 Rather, the IRS bases this approach on common law, citing 
                                                     
278. Although beyond the scope of this Article, one could also make a convincing argument that 
the purported charitable beneficiaries are also harmed. Given that all the assets of the organization 
are being spent on salaries, one may assume that the charity would have less impact, robbing 
potential beneficiaries of the full-promise of the organization’s charitable activity.  
279. See IRS Pub. 557 supra note 40. 
280. See All About Cookies, FAQS, GIRL SCOUTS, https://www.girlscouts.org/en/cookies/all-
about-cookies/FAQs.html [perma.cc/WFA7-2Q8K]. 
281. See GIRL SCOUTS, https://www.girlscouts.org/ [perma.cc/DG3Y-7CD9]. 
282. See Colombo, supra note 193. 
283. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,257 (Sept. 15, 1977). 
284. Id. 
285. Hopkins, supra note 58, at 642 (“An organization was denied recognition of exemption as a 
charitable and educational entity because it charged ‘substantial fees,’ even though the federal tax 
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the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which states that an organization is 
charitable even if it charges the beneficiaries for its services “if the 
income so derived is to be used only to maintain the institution or for 
some other charitable purpose.”286 This is true even if the charity realizes 
a profit, “provided that the profits are to be applied only to charitable 
purposes.”287 The IRS emphasizes that the determinative factor is not the 
fee, but the benefit to the community. As noted by the IRS: 
In most cases in which an organization is directly serving the 
community, the fact that it charges a reasonable fee for goods or 
services should not preclude its exemption. For example, if a 
community swimming pool is of sufficient benefit to the 
community to warrant recognition as a legal charity . . . the fact 
that the organization charges admission fees sufficient to cover 
its cost of operation should not be important. On the other hand, 
if an organization’s activities are not sufficiently beneficial to 
the community, it would not be exempt even if it charged a 
reduced fee, or no fee at all. The determinative factor is how the 
organization’s activities serve the community rather than 
whether a fee is charged.288 
The memorandum goes on to note that the IRS reserves the right to 
determine that a fee may be so high as to limit access to a small group.289 
In such cases, the organization would cease to provide a public benefit, 
and would no longer qualify as a charity.290 Further complicating matters 
is the fact that the regulatory regime singles out fees paid for services 
that are “inherently charitable,” such as education, health care, child 
care, and elder care, for special treatment.291 In such cases, charities may 
charge “fair-market-value fees” without running afoul of regulations.292 
For activities that fall outside of these specified areas, fees that are not 
“substantially-below-cost” may constitute unrelated business income and 
may jeopardize the charity’s tax exemption.293 
Setting aside the complexity of the rules, the justification for 
permitting this practice is refreshingly practical, with the IRS noting that 
                                                                                                                      
law does not preclude exemption on that basis.”). 
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 (1959). 
287. Id.  
288. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,257, supra note 283, at 7 (emphasis added). 
289. Id. (“[T]he fact that a fee makes it impossible for some people in the community to receive 
the service is acceptable, but a fee so large that it would exclude most of the community would not 
be acceptable.”). 
290. Id.  
291. See Mayer, supra note 190, at 101. 
292. Id. at 101–02. 
293. Id. at 102. 
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“the existence of [charitable] organizations may depend upon their 
ability to charge for the services that they provide.”294 Further, the ability 
for charities to charge fees is consistent with the relatively liberal policy 
permitting commercial activity by charities. As long as the fees collected 
are related to the organization’s charitable purpose and not unreasonably 
high, the activity will not jeopardize the organization’s charitable status.295 
Given this complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that the IRS has 
failed to establish clear guidelines for determining precisely when fees 
become impermissibly high.296 While the IRS provides some guidance—
charities ought to levy fees substantially below the cost of operation, 
charities should not compete with commercial providers, and sales 
should be more than incidental to the charitable purpose297—the 
resulting case-by-case regime is predictably inconsistent.298 The best one 
might confidently say is that the IRS views fees for charitable services 
with some suspicion, and there is some undefined point at which fees 
become unreasonably high. 
If the restriction against unreasonably high fees is to have any 
meaning, the IRS must have monitoring tools in place that examine the 
amount and character of any fees charged. Unfortunately, the monitoring 
mechanisms in place are inadequate. For example, if an organization 
does not qualify as a Smaller Charity, it must report fees as part of its 
program service revenue on the Forms 990 and 990-EZ.299 Although this 
disclosure is a good start, neither of the forms require the organization to 
separately disclose fees from other program service revenue, so it is 
impossible for the IRS (or for that matter, the general public) to 
determine the reasonableness of fees. Perhaps suspiciously high program 
service revenue would inspire further inquiries, but this reporting 
procedure is inadequate if the goal is to determine reasonableness of fees 
for charitable services. But however inadequate the Forms 990 and 990-
EZ may be with respect to measuring the reasonableness of fees, they 
are a far cry better than the e-Postcard, which provides absolutely no 
financial information of Smaller Charities. Thus, if program service 
revenue were suspiciously high for a Smaller Charity, there would be no 
                                                     
294. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,257, supra note 283, at 7. 
295. Hopkins, supra note 58, at 641 (“Many tax-exempt organizations charge fees for the services 
they provide; where the business generating this revenue is a related one, the receipts are 
characterized as exempt function revenue.”). 
296. Colombo, supra note 226, at 849. As Colombo notes, “no clear guidance exists for when an 
activity crosses the line from exempt to ‘commercial.’” Id. 
297. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,257, supra note 283, at 9. 
298. Hopkins, supra note 58, at 642 (“Frequently, the agency will take the position that the 
charging of fees is evidence of substantial commercial activity or purpose . . . .”). 
299. See INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-EZ, supra note 135, at 11. 
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means of discovering it and neither the IRS nor the general public would 
have the capability of deducing anything about program service revenue 
other than the fact that the charity avers that it is under $50,000. 
Thus, although the IRS has exhibited discomfort with charities 
charging fees for service, there is no adequate means to discover the 
character and amount of such fees. Similar to the concerns regarding 
paying excessive salaries, donors might be upset to learn that a charity is 
charging fees for the charitable services provided. A donor might 
reasonably ask: if the charity is charging fees to cover its charitable 
activities, what is my donation for? The current regulatory regime has no 
acceptable answer. 
In sum, the regulatory regime permits a number of Disfavored 
Activities so long as they are reasonable (e.g., salaries), related to charity 
(e.g., commercial activity), or not egregious (e.g., fees for services). 
There are certainly good arguments to permit such activities; perhaps 
charities must pay salaries to entice qualified individuals to leave the 
promised riches of the private market, or maybe a charity’s commercial 
activities and fees for services serve to bolster the limited assets 
necessary to engage in good works. Regardless of the justifications, 
there are limits on Disfavored Activities, and when these limits are 
exceeded, the regulatory regime imposes excise taxes300 and threatens 
the loss of tax-exempt status.301 But without an adequate means of 
monitoring these activities, any purported limits are meaningless. 
B. A Tarnished Halo 
As the previous section illustrated, the failure to screen or monitor 
Smaller Charities results in a number of micro-level harms. That is to 
say, the current regulatory regime fails to identify and stop charities 
from charging excessive fees for their charitable services, paying 
insiders unreasonably high salaries, or engaging in substantial amounts 
of commercial activity. This Article refers to these harms as “micro” 
because they largely affect the individual donors to the charity, who 
cannot assume that donations will be spent in a charitable manner, and 
for-profit entities that compete with charities and might fall prey to 
unfair competition. There is, however, a larger, more macro-level harm 
that results from the widespread failure to police charities: the fading of 
an ineffable good known as a “warm glow.”302 The warm glow is “a 
                                                     
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1222 (2010) (“Warm glow can 
derive from moral satisfaction, social approbation, or simply the status signal of being able to spend 
generously.” (citing B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: 
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specific kind of utility that comes from giving.”303 As described by 
Professor Usha Rodrigues, 
a local nonprofit food cooperative is selling more than the free-
range eggs or organic strawberries that Whole Foods and other 
for-profits market so effectively. The co-op offers community 
participation and an investment in local farms, a distinctive 
ethos that is incompatible with the profit motive and closely 
connected to the construction of an individual’s social identity.304 
The warm glow is a powerful enough incentive to suggest that 
charities rich in warm glow may not need the tax-benefits of charitable 
status to survive.305 As Rodrigues argues, “[e]ven in a tax-neutral world, 
at least some nonprofits would continue to flourish because they offer a 
special kind of warm glow that for-profits cannot provide, the warm 
glow of participating in a nonprofit organization.”306 It is for this reason 
that any threat to the warm glow of the charitable sector gives rise to 
concern, as the lack of a warm glow could be devastating to many 
charities. Imagine, for example, that the public can no longer trust 
Rodrigues’s hypothetical co-op to contribute to one’s social identity—if, 
for example, the co-op began to aggressively focus on cutting overhead 
to the extent that it preferred commercial farms over local farms—the 
value of shopping at the co-op is significantly lessened. A rational 
consumer would likely start to reconsider their patronage and maybe opt 
to frequent an alternative, such as Whole Foods. If, after all, the only 
thing purchased is organic produce (without any warm glow), there are a 
multitude of options for most consumers.307 
Scholars who have studied the warm glow of charities often point to 
the ever-increasing incidents of scandals in the charitable sector.308 
Through these scandals, the regulation of charities (or lack thereof) 
periodically draws the attention of the general public.309 The general 
                                                                                                                      
Welfare and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard Decision-Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
ITS APPLICATIONS 7, 62–65 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 712–13 (1996)). 
303. Usha Rodrigues, The Power of Warm Glow, 88 TEX. L. REV. 149, 151 (2009) [hereinafter 
Rodrigues, The Power of Warm Glow]. 
304. Id. at 152–53. 
305. Id. at 153. 
306. Id. 
307. Id.  
308. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 1, 18 (2011). 
309. See id. at 3 (“The concerns about charities surfaced largely through press reports and are 
legion: spending of earmarked contributions for non-earmarked purposes; excess compensation to 
organization insiders; mission drift—deliberate, or aided by faulty corporate governance; 
acceptance of property contributions when donors or others are the principal beneficiaries; 
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pattern is that a sufficiently scandalous activity draws the attention of the 
media,310 which in turn sparks debate and consternation from 
lawmakers.311 The very existence of the scandals and their discussion in 
popular media is relevant not necessarily because it highlights a problem 
endemic in the charitable sector, but because “the scandals, and the 
legislative solutions they prompted, suggest that our current system of 
rules and oversight is not sufficient.”312 In other words, the press 
coverage of scandals could be seen as a leading indicator of the public’s 
growing loss of faith in the charitable sector.313 
Although the connection between press coverage and public faith may 
not be conclusive, there is good reason to believe that scandals erode the 
public’s support of the charitable sector. The very nature of the 
charitable sector relies upon the continued blessing of the general public. 
After all, the public is essentially footing the bill of all charitable 
activity, since the tax-exemption of charities effectively serves as a 
subsidy of the charitable sector.314 And if the charity “leverage[es] its 
tax-exempt status for the sake of a few extra dollars” the “cost (revenue 
lost to the government) [is] ultimately borne by all taxpayers.”315 
Further, even if a scandal is not the causal element of a taxpayer loss, the 
perception of widespread charitable ill-deeds might have a wide-ranging 
negative effect on the charitable sector as a whole. 
Without proper enforcement, the loss of faith and the related dimming 
of the warm glow is inevitable. This concern is evident in a letter 
bemoaning the widespread legal noncompliance of the charitable sector 
by Internal Revenue Commissioner Mark W. Everson.316 Everson notes 
that a failure to address the sector’s noncompliance risks “the loss of the 
faith and support that the public has always given to this sector.”317 In 
other words, the positive public perception of charities—a vital 
                                                                                                                      
participation in illicit tax shelter transactions; spending for non-charitable purposes; accumulations 
of income; failure to provide charitable services; use of the charitable form for non-charitable 
purposes; questionable investment practices; participation in political campaigns; and self-dealing 
transactions, to name a few.”). 
310. See id. at 19.  
311. See id. at 8. Such scandals, according to Colinvaux, “seriously eroded the ‘halo’ effect of 
charitable organizations and enabled passage of reform legislation, but also illustrated the 
consequences of unchecked growth.” Id. 
312. See id. at 20. 
313. See id. 
314. See Hansmann, supra note 232, at 621. 
315. See Colinvaux, supra note 308, at 27. 
316. Albert B. Crenshaw, Tax Abuse Rampant in Nonprofits, IRS Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 
2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2005/04/05/tax-abuse-rampant-in-
nonprofits-irs-says/db3fff8d-3206-4493-961f-ddd24c224c91/ [https://perma.cc/Q4X3-SMCC]. 
317. See id. 
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component of a charity’s value—is endangered by a lax regulatory 
system.318 
Unregulated Disfavored Activities present a direct threat to the 
charitable sector’s continued enjoyment of warm glow. Unreasonable 
salaries, for example, are seen as particularly galling to the general 
public.319 As Colinvaux notes, charitable payment of excessive 
compensation directly contradicts “the general public’s perception of 
charity and what it means to do charity.”320 There is also an argument, 
however counterintuitive, that the preference for low salaries is not 
limited to donors, as employees view warm glow as a component of 
their compensation.321 Rodrigues argues that “[i]f [a charity] were to 
begin doling out large salaries or lavish perquisites, while an employee’s 
monetary income might rise, the identity value derived from being part 
of a nonprofit would fall.”322 Further, the practice of relying upon fees 
for service to support charitable activities has often come under scrutiny, 
primarily in the realm of nonprofit hospitals.323 In this manner, 
widespread and unchecked Disfavored Activities might “create 
reputational externalities for the whole sector.”324 
                                                     
318. Brian Galle, Keeping Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1214 (2010) (“[T]he fact 
that society perceives an organization as charitable is a critical element of the entity’s success.” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also Rossman, supra note 121, at 101 (“[T]he chief function of the IRS as 
it relates to the charitable sector is to monitor who qualifies for 501(c)(3) status to assure the public 
and donors that the charitable subsidy is utilized for legitimate charitable purposes as the law has 
defined them.”). 
319. See Colinvaux, supra note 308, at 37 (“So it can come as a shock for some to learn that 
executives or employees of charitable organizations earn hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
dollars a year, even if the amount is reasonable in legal terms or is established pursuant to arm’s 
length negotiations and at a ‘market’ rate.”). 
320. See id. 
321. See Galle, supra note 318, at 1223 (“In effect, the employees are making donations of the 
difference between their salary and the market salary for someone of their talents and realizing the 
psychic rewards from the gift.”). 
322. Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1259, 1284 (2011). 
323. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Charles Grassley to Charles Rettig, Commissioner of the IRS, 
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/20190219%20CEG%20to%20I
RS%20%28Nonprofit%20hospital%20compliance%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EXD-2ZHS] (“[I]t 
appears that at least some of these tax-exempt hospitals have cut charity care, despite increased 
revenue, calling into question their compliance with the standards set by Congress.”); TOP 82 U.S. 
NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS, QUANTIFYING GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS AND FINANCIAL ASSETS, OPEN 
THE BOOKS 4–11 (2019), available at https://issuu.com/openthebooks/docs/top_82_largest_ 
u.s._non-profit_hosp (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (noting that the revenues of 82 large nonprofit 
hospitals totaled $296,557,776,914); Wendi C. Thomas, The Nonprofit Hospital That Makes 
Millions, Owns a Collection Agency and Relentlessly Sues the Poor, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/methodist-le-bonheur-healthcare-sues-poor-medical-debt 
[https://perma.cc/9GZS-9R32] (criticizing a Memphis-based nonprofit hospital for aggressive 
collection lawsuits). 
324. See Galle, supra note 318, at 1232. Galle’s quote referred specifically to “self-dealing” by 
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To the extent donors can no longer trust charities to be faithful 
stewards of their contributions, they will, quite reasonably, stop 
donating.325 This is especially true because charities are not the only 
means of obtaining the warm glow.326 Rodrigues notes that “[a]nimal 
lovers, for example, can feed stray dogs or adopt them. If interested in 
more systemic solutions, they can pay to spay or neuter individual dogs 
they encounter.”327 Of course, even the most fervent animal lover would 
not likely take to the streets and administer piecemeal birth control, 
because it is much more efficient to find an appropriate organization for 
a donation.328 But to the extent the animal lover has no faith that a 
donation will be used in a charitable manner, they might be forced to 
engage in such inefficient activities to obtain the specifically sought-
after warm glow. Regardless of the example’s absurdity, the point is 
salient: the charitable sector does not have a warm glow monopoly and a 
collective loss of faith that diminishes the warm glow could prove fatal 
to the charitable regime. It is in this manner that the failure of the 
regulatory regime to adequately screen and monitor charities not only 
results in micro-level harms (excessive salaries, commercial activity, and 
fees for services), but also the potentially devastating macro-level harm 
of the charitable sector losing the warm glow. 
III. RISK-BASED REGULATION 
At this point, the IRS might reasonably cry foul. How is an agency 
that is consistently underfunded expected to keep pace with a regulated 
population that continues to grow in number and complexity? Indeed, in 
many ways, the IRS’s decision to ignore Smaller Charities might be 
deemed both intuitive and rational.329 Given the IRS’s crippling budget 
restrictions, regulatory sacrifices must be made, and it is reasonable to 
focus resources and attention on the regulated population that represents 
a greater risk.330 If Smaller Charities represent less risk, then moving 
                                                                                                                      
managers, but the point stands that one charity’s activity reflects on the entire sector. Id. 
325. See Rodrigues, supra note 303, at 152 (“Knowledge of the economics of the transaction, the 
ultimate profit motive of the for-profit charity entrepreneur, the risk of contract failure, and the 
inability to measure desired outputs combine inexorably to produce the suspicion that the donor is 
really just a sucker.”). 
326. See Rodrigues, The Power of Warm Glow, supra note 303, at 1275. 
327. See id. 
328. See id. 
329. ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, THEORY, STRATEGY, AND 
PRACTICE 282 (2012) (“Risk-based regulation was originally used as a way to justify regulatory 
efforts with reference to a rational calculus.”). 
330. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 2.  
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regulatory resources to higher-risk populations is theoretically 
justifiable. This approach is known as risk-based regulation,331 and it 
argues not only that a focus on the regulated population which presents 
the highest risks should be encouraged, but also that the related 
reduction in resources dedicated to lower risk populations is not 
necessarily a regulatory failure.332 
Risk-based regulation allows a resource-strapped regulatory body to 
leverage its precious resources in a manner that results in the greatest 
impact.333 Again, this is intuitive. Take, for example, an agency charged 
with enforcing anti-pollution regulations to maintain clean waterways. It 
would not make sense to spend the bulk of the agency’s time and effort 
chasing small, occasional sources of pollution if a single paper factory 
causes 90% of the pollution in the waterways. This intuitive appeal is 
evident in the fact that risk-based regulation “has exploded in popularity 
in a host of sectors across the world.”334 
However, the popularity of risk-based regulation should not obscure 
its challenges. This approach is not neutral, and choices made by 
regulatory bodies have consequences on the effectiveness of regulations 
and the activities of the regulated population.335 First, a regulatory body 
must determine how to not only measure the risk, but how to define it.336 
Further, the obvious consequence of this regulatory choice is that 
populations identified as “low-risk” will receive less scrutiny.337 Ideally, 
the regulatory agency makes this decision deliberately, and not merely 
as the thoughtless byproduct of limited regulatory resources.338 In 
addition, the challenges inherent in risk-based regulation require 
regulators to consider how to both implement the risk-based regulatory 
                                                     
331. See BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 329, at 281. Risk-based regulation “is the prioritizing of 
regulatory actions in accordance with an assessment of the risks that parties will present to the 
regulatory body’s achieving objectives.” Id. 
332. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 1. In risk-based regulation, “the tendency is for 
regulators’ gaze to be drawn to their highest risks and for regulators to be encouraged to pull back 
resources from lower risks.” Id. 
333. See id. 
334. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 329, at 281; see also Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, Really 
Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 LAW & POL’Y 181, 182 (2010) (noting that “regulators have 
been developing risk-based frameworks of supervision in a wide range of countries, particularly in 
the areas of environment, food safety, occupational health and safety, financial services, and 
pension regulation”). 
335.  BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 329, at 283. 
336. See id. (“Each aspect of a risk-based framework involves a complex set of choices and 
evaluations on such matters as the risk to be focused on and how such risks are to be defined.”). 
337. See id. (“Risk-based regimes also demand that the regulator makes decisions on the risks 
that it will not prioritize.”). 
338. See id. 
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strategy and build flexibility into the risk-based regime to ensure 
continued effectiveness.339 
Compounding the difficulty of implementation are the peculiar issues 
presented by the population that has been identified (rightly or wrongly) 
as “low-risk.” After all, the recognition of a population as low-risk 
should not relieve the regulator of its duty to regulate such population. 
Indeed, low-risk populations generally make up the majority of the 
regulated population,340 and low-risk populations may present risks with 
the capacity to evolve, grow, and spread.341 In other words, if in the rare 
occasion that the low-risk population produces harms that are always 
small and acceptable, then there is no problem with the lack of 
regulation of low-risk populations. But when low-risk populations 
present the capability of generating great harm, the risk-based regulatory 
calculus must be adjusted.342 
In a series of seminal articles, Professors Julia Black and Robert 
Baldwin discuss the specific challenges of risk-based regulation of low-
risk populations343 and they are the only scholars to propose an 
analytical framework for regulators to consider when designing regimes 
to regulate low-risk actors.344 Black and Baldwin’s work follows a rich 
history of scholarship dedicated to theories of regulatory enforcement, 
from Ian Ayres and John Braithwhite’s responsive regulation345 to 
Malcom K. Sparrow’s challenge to “pick important problems and fix 
them,”346 and represents the first serious treatment of regulating low-risk 
populations. Black and Baldwin’s framework is not a magic bullet, in 
that it describes in fairly general terms what a successful risk-based 
regulatory system might look like, while simultaneously leaving the 
details to individual regulators. This is because Black and Baldwin’s 
work focuses on regulation without specific reference to any industry, 
and the authors hope the framework might work equally well for an 
environmental regulator as it would for the IRS.347 These shortcomings 
                                                     
339. See generally id. at 283–94. 
340. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 2 (“The bulk of regulated sites and operations, 
however, tend to present lower levels of risk and most regulators need to deal with lower risks in 
some way or other.”). 
341. Id. (noting that low-risk populations “have some capacity to produce both significant harms 
and political contention, and in many cases the law will demand that lower risks be attended to”). 
342. See id. 
343. See id. 
344. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 133. 
345. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992).  
346. MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING 
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 154 (2000). 
347. For example, the framework assumes that regulators engage in some minimal amount of 
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aside, it is a useful framework for agencies interested in critically 
assessing its regulatory priorities. 
At the outset, Black and Baldwin emphasize that the challenges of 
any risk-based regulation begin with the unavoidable conclusion that 
when “resources are moved to . . . higher risks, they are necessarily 
withdrawn from somewhere else.”348 While this observation may seem a 
bit obvious, the consequences are significant. Black and Baldwin discuss 
a number of potential problems with defining certain groups as “low-
risk.”349 For example, the regulated population may blanch at the 
agency’s perceived indifference to harms produced by low-risk 
populations, especially “[w]hen harm occurs at a low-risk site” and the 
regulator is forced not only to defend “why that site was a low priority 
for action” but also that the site “will continue to be a low priority.”350 
Using the previous polluting paper factory hypothetical, if the regulatory 
agency adequately stems the pollution from the paper factory, but fails to 
stop an individual’s persistent (but small scale) dumping, the neighbor of 
the individual polluter may not appreciate the lack of current or future 
policing. Further, the regulator must contend with the fact that risks are 
dynamic.351 The determination by regulators to impose lower scrutiny on 
a particular population “is not so much a characterization of the risk 
itself as a statement of a risk’s relative significance to the regulatory 
organization.”352 In other words, defining a population as low-risk is 
simply an indication of priority, and, because of the dynamism of low 
risk populations, regulators must stay vigilant to recognize those “low 
net risks [that] mutate to higher risks.”353 
There are therefore multiple challenges inherent in risk-based 
regulation. The regulatory agency must properly assess the risk, devise 
appropriate regulatory tools, and periodically reassess the regulatory 
regime to ensure effectiveness. Each of these challenges is discussed 
briefly below,354 but Black and Baldwin note that “[i]n its idealized 
                                                                                                                      
regulatory activity for the entire regulated population. This assumption, although quite reasonable, 
does not hold true for the IRS’s regulation of smaller charities. 
348. Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 6.  
349. Id. 
350. Id. at 7 (“[A] regulator’s giving a risk a low priority may be contested by consumers, local 
residents, politicians, NGOs, and industry.”). 
351. Id.  
352. Id. at 4. 
353. Id. at 7. 
354. Commentators have identified other challenges, including how the regulatory body plans to 
defend low-risk regulation when a harm occurs. “When harm occurs at a low-risk site, it may be 
difficult to explain why that site was a low priority for action, and will continue to be a low 
priority.” Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 7. This article is less interested in the political 
consequences of the regulatory decisions, but Professor Yin suggests that the IRS’s recent 
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form, risk-based regulation offers an evidence-based means of targeting 
the use of resources and of prioritizing attention to the highest risks in 
accordance with a transparent, systematic, and defensible framework.”355 
As the following sections illustrate, although the IRS’s chosen regulatory 
regime is both transparent and systematic, it is far from defensible. 
A. The First Challenge: Assessing the Risk 
Naturally, the first challenge for risk-based regulation is to properly 
assess the risks presented by the regulated population.356 As Black and 
Baldwin note, risk-based regulatory frameworks all “vary considerably 
in their complexity,” but 
have a common starting point, which is a focus on risks not 
rules. Risk-based frameworks require regulators to begin by 
identifying the risks they are seeking to manage, not the rules 
they have to enforce. Regulators are usually overburdened by 
rules. They cannot enforce every one of these rules in every firm 
at every point in time. Selections have to be made.357 
While it makes sense to ask a regulatory body to focus its resources 
on the populations that pose the greatest risk, the process of determining 
where the greatest risk lies is not a straightforward endeavor. This 
determination is a judgment call, rife with potential for both mistake and 
arbitrariness.358 Given the fact that risk-based regulation is ultimately a 
determination of regulatory capacity, risk-assessment must also weigh 
the costs of imposing variable regulatory intensity on different portions 
of the regulated population.359 But a myopic focus on costs and limited 
resources would be disastrous, as the resultant lighter regulatory pressure 
on a large swath of the regulated population also has consequences.360 
Black and Baldwin identify five “common core elements” of agencies 
that successfully assess risk in risk-based regulatory frameworks. First, 
                                                                                                                      
regulatory decisions evidence the IRS’s intent to avoid criticism. Noting the Streamlined 
Application’s utter lack of rigor, Yin notes that “[i]f there is nothing for the IRS to do, and the 
agency in fact doesn’t do anything, it would seem there will be no basis for criticism of the agency.” 
Yin, supra note 3, at 268. 
355. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 181. 
356. Id. at 184. 
357. Id. 
358. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 329, at 283 (“This process is, however, not mechanical, since it 
demands that judgments be made on a number of matters.”). 
359. Id. at 284 (“The difficulty here is that the costs of influencing regulatees may vary 
according, inter alia to the regulatees’ dispositions, cultures, and capacities.”). 
360. Id. (“[I]f regulators pay the closest attention to those firms that present the greatest risks, this 
inevitably means that some firms will ‘fly under the radar’ to a lesser or greater degree because they 
do not meet the risk threshold for such priority of attention.”). 
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the regulatory body clearly articulates their objectives.361 Second, it 
identifies its own risk tolerance, with an eye toward political risk.362 
Third, the regulator must assess the potential harm and its probability.363 
Fourth, the regulator must rank the regulated population in terms of the 
potential harms and their probability.364 And fifth, the regulatory body 
must shift resources to reflect the risk assessment.365 
In the matter at hand, the IRS appears to have completely skipped or 
glossed over elements one, three, and four, and instead focused on the 
second and fifth elements. For the first element—clearly articulating an 
objective—the IRS’s objective appeared to be little more than 
eliminating the tax-exempt application backlog.366 As noted in the press 
release announcing the Streamlined Application, “[t]he [Streamlined 
Application] will allow the IRS to speed the approval process for smaller 
groups and free up resources to review applications from larger, more 
complex organizations while reducing the application backlog.”367 
Rather than focusing on screening and monitoring charities, the IRS’s 
actions suggest that there were few concerns that trumped administrative 
efficiency. For the third element—assessing harm and its probability—
the IRS identified charities that regularly expect to realize no more than 
$50,000 in gross annual receipts as the low-risk population without 
providing any argument for why the threshold is appropriate. In 
announcing the launch of the Form 1023EZ, Commissioner Koskinen 
conclusively stated that “many small organizations will be able to 
complete this form without creating major compliance risks.”368 Neither 
Koskinen nor the IRS cited any study or research suggesting the lower 
risk presented by Smaller Charities, nor did they identify any reasoning 
or methodology for selecting the threshold. This reinforces the suspicion 
held by many observers that the IRS adopted the Streamlined 
Application because the agency had “accumulated a massive backlog of 
applications, causing unacceptable delays in their processing, and it is 
                                                     
361. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 184 (“First, they require a determination by the 
organization of its objectives—of the risks ‘to what’ that it is concerned to control.”). 
362. Id. (“Secondly, they require a determination of the regulator’s own risk appetite—what type 
of risks is it prepared to tolerate and at what level. This can be an extremely challenging task for a 
regulator. In practice, a regulator’s risk tolerance is often ultimately driven by political 
considerations.”). 
363. Id. (“Thirdly, risk-based frameworks involve an assessment of the hazard or adverse event 
and the likelihood of it occurring.”). 
364. Id. at 185. 
365. Id. 
366. See, e.g., Viswanathan, supra note 21, at 91; Yin, supra note 3, at 268. 
367. See IRS Press Release, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
368. See id. 
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now under severe budgetary constraints, with no relief in sight.”369 There 
is no evidence that the IRS was driven by anything other than a desire to 
address the regulatory burden, and the adoption of the Streamlined 
Application had nothing to do with any belief that Smaller Charities 
caused, or had the potential to cause, lower risk. 
As noted above, the IRS did not completely ignore all of the 
“common core elements” of successful risk-based regulatory 
frameworks, and it appears that the IRS focused on the second and 
fourth elements. Indeed, the second element—identifying the agency’s 
risk tolerance, with attention paid to political risk—there is evidence that 
the decision to implement the Streamlined Application was almost 
entirely driven by the agency’s risk-tolerance. The lack of screening 
procedures combined with the IRS’s statement that “small soccer or 
gardening club[s]” received the same scrutiny as “major research 
organization[s],” make it clear that the IRS’s risk-tolerance for charitable 
malfeasance by Smaller Charities is quite high, while its tolerance for 
suffering accusations of inefficiency is much lower.370 For the fourth 
element—ranking the regulated population—the IRS simply created a 
threshold and deemed all actors below $50,000 in gross receipts as low-
risk.371 No inquiry was made into the activities of such actors or the 
various risks presented by different types of charities that happen to fall 
under the gross receipts threshold. The IRS ably tackled the fifth 
element—shifting resources to the population identified as high-risk—
by crafting the Streamlined Application and shifting regulatory focus on 
charities that filed the Form 1023. Thus, based upon the five elements of 
successful low-risk regulation identified by Black and Baldwin, the 
IRS’s risk-based regulatory scheme does not inspire much confidence 
that the risks were appropriately assessed. 
B. The Second Challenge: Finding the Right Tool 
The second major challenge of risk-based regulation is how the 
regulator implements the regulation in light of the risk evaluations.372 
Assuming the regulator has successfully identified a high-risk 
population, the question is how, precisely, the regulator ought to reduce 
those risks. The choices are obvious: the regulator may develop a more 
intense regulatory regime for higher risk populations, it may implement 
less intense procedures for low-risk populations, or both. In our 
                                                     
369. Yin, supra note 3, at 268. 
370. See IRS Press Release, supra note 14. 
371. Id. 
372. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 329, at 285. 
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hypothetical water pollution agency, the regulator may, for example, 
engage in monthly on-site inspections of the high polluting paper plant 
to ensure compliance with the relevant rules. For the smaller polluters, 
the agency might engage in less frequent on-site visits, correspondence 
audits, or self-reporting. Although the lower scrutiny gives rise to a 
higher probability that the smaller polluters will be noncompliant, the 
potential damage is low if the regulator properly identified the level of 
potential risk. 
For tax-exempt applications, the IRS decided not to develop a 
different regulatory tool for high-risk applicants. Instead, the IRS 
decided to continue to use the regulatory tools already in place—that is, 
the full Form 1023 and the annual reporting requirements—rather than 
implement new regulatory tools. Thus, rather than impose higher 
scrutiny on high-risk populations, the IRS decided to implement less 
scrutiny on low-risk populations. The underlying assumption, one of 
doubtful veracity, is that the existing regulatory tools were sufficient to 
monitor high-risk applicants.373 More damningly, as the next sections 
illustrate, the IRS’s chosen regulatory tools for the low-risk population 
were poorly crafted. 
1. The GRID and Regulating Low-Risk Populations 
Black and Baldwin have crafted the only methodology for 
determining the appropriate regulatory tools for low-risk populations: 
the Good Regulatory Intervention Design (“GRID”).374 The first step in 
implementing the GRID is to categorize the nature of the activity 
through Black and Baldwin’s typology of low-risk, with categories 
ranging from a stable activity with inherent low risk to an instable 








                                                     
373. Lloyd H. Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: 
An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 479, 480 (2010) (“For more than fifty years 
scholars have expressed concerns that while there is a general consensus regarding the legal duties 
of nonprofit, and particularly charity, officers, directors, and trustees, enforcement of those duties 
has been spotty and haphazard at best.”). 
374. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 136. 
375. Id. at 136–37. 
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Inherent low risk – stable The activity is not capable of 
producing intolerable 
harms/impacts and operations are 
not likely to change in the periods 




Net low risk – stable The activity is capable of 
producing intolerable 
harms/impacts in the periods 
between regulators’ strategy 




Inherent low risk, but 
may change or 
accumulate 
The activity is not capable (as 
presently organized) of producing 
intolerable harms/impacts in the 
periods between regulators’ 
strategy reviews but 
operations . . . may change or 
there may be numbers of such 




Net low risk but may 
change or accumulate 
The activity is capable of 
producing intolerable 
harms/impacts in the periods 
between regulators’ strategy 
reviews but, at present, risks are 
reduced by good management. 
That good management may, 
however, change or there may be 
numbers of such risks being 
created that create a cumulative 
problem. 
 
Once the activity is categorized, the regulator must categorize the 
nature of the regulated population, measuring both the regulatees’ 
motivation and capacity to comply.376 After these determinations are 
made, the GRID matrix, set forth below, helps regulators determine the 
proper regulatory tools.377 
                                                     
376. Id. 
377. Id. at 137. Please note that the matrix that appears below has been slightly edited for clarity. 
More specifically, the matrix set forth below only indicates the regulatory intensity and omits the 
lists of categories of regulatory activities (screening tools, monitoring tools, and engagement and 
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According to Black and Baldwin, “[t]he aim of the GRID is to 
provide a framework for deciding systematically which strategies should 
be used for which type of risk and which type of regulatee.”382 As the 
GRID makes clear, Black and Baldwin suggest differing levels of 
intensity (from low to high) depending on how the regulator categorizes 
each of the risk and the regulated population. The GRID therefore 
                                                                                                                      
incentive mechanisms). 
378. Id. at 136 (“Regulatees are willing to comply (judged on their records and/or officers’ 
estimations) and are sufficiently well-informed, resourced, and organized to allow compliance.”). 
379. Id.  
380. Id. (“Regulatees are less willing to comply but they are sufficiently well informed, 
resourced, and organized to allow compliance if their motivation is improved.”). 
381. Id. (“Regulatees are less willing to comply and are not sufficiently well informed, resourced, 
and organized to foster compliance even if their motivation is improved.”). 
382. Id. 
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provides a mechanism for regulators to properly assess risk and craft 
appropriate regulatory tools for the low-risk population. However, as 
attractive as the GRID may appear, the authors are quick to note that 
[a] “best practice” framework cannot neatly reconcile public 
expectations of universal protection with the regulatory reality 
of prioritization and rationing. It can, however, help regulators 
to identify those intervention tools that are likely to have the 
most potential in relation to different risks and contexts.383 
The theory behind the GRID is simple: impose higher intensity of 
intervention based upon both the nature of the risk (moving horizontally 
from left to right) and nature of the regulated population (moving 
vertically from top to bottom). Thus, the population and risk that 
deserves the lowest intensity of intervention is at the upper left-hand 
corner of the GRID (for instance, the regulated population that is well-
motivated with capacity to comply and also boasts an inherent low risk 
that is stable).384 The next sections will apply the GRID matrix to the 
regulation of Smaller Charities. 
2. The First Step: The Nature of the Activity 
As noted above, the first step is to categorize the nature of the 
regulated activity with respect to the level of risk and stability.385 In 
other words, the task is to determine the GRID column in which the 
regulated population belongs. Taking the issue at hand, we can use the 
process of elimination to determine which category applies to Smaller 
Charities. If one assumes that the harm or impact possible with less than 
$50,000 in gross receipts is acceptable, then one could conceivably 
argue that, given their size, Smaller Charities do not present the 
possibility of intolerable harms. This may place the population in 
Category 1 (inherent low risk—stable). However, this argument ignores 
the fact that without meaningful policing of charitable activity, there is 
no mechanism that ensures the charities remain small.386 When a charity 
completes the Streamlined Application, for example, it certifies that it 
reasonably believes it will make no more than $50,000 in any of the next 
three years.387 It does not, however, promise to remain under this 
threshold and, to the extent that gross revenues serve as a proxy for risk 
(an arguable claim, but this argument reflects the apparent logic of the 
                                                     
383. Id. 
384. Id. at 141.  
385. Id. at 136.  
386. Id.  
387. See Form 1023-EZ, supra note 71. 
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IRS), it would not be accurate to label the risk Smaller Charities pose as 
“stable” given the potential for gross receipts to grow. To put a fine 
point on it, Smaller Charities may not remain small. Further, to the 
extent the abuse of salaries, commercial activity, and fees for service 
represent a risk, we cannot safely conclude that Smaller Charities have 
an “inherent” low risk because Smaller Charities, just like larger 
charities, have the ability to engage in Disfavored Activities. Thus, 
Smaller Charities do not belong in the first category. 
For similar reasons, Category 3 (inherent low risk but may change or 
accumulate) also fails. Although Category 3 is a better fit than Category 
1, due to its recognition that Smaller Charities might grow (thereby 
remedying the incorrect assumption about a Smaller Charity’s 
“stability”), it fails to properly assess the risk. It is not possible to 
characterize the risk posed by Smaller Charities as “inherently low” 
unless the regulatory body has some means of monitoring and limiting 
the risks. Smaller Charities may not only engage in activities that cause 
the organization to realize more than $50,000 in gross receipts, but they 
may also engage in unacceptable levels of commercial activity, pay 
unreasonably high salaries, and charge unconscionably high fees for 
their charitable services. Just as Category 1 failed due to the 
mischaracterization of the potential risk, Category 3 is inappropriate. 
Category 2 (net low risk—stable) is an equally poor fit for Smaller 
Charities. While this category permits the possibility that Smaller 
Charities might produce intolerable harms, thereby addressing the poor 
fit in Categories 1 and 3, it requires controlling the risks through good 
management. Good management relies upon properly educated 
managers who are aware of the limits placed upon charities. The failure 
of the Streamlined Application to properly educate would-be charities 
suggests that this level of education should not be assumed. And as 
previous sections showed, the IRS has virtually no mechanism to 
manage this risk at either the application stage or through on-going 
monitoring for Smaller Charities.388 Thus, Category 2 is not appropriate. 
The only category that appears to describe the regulated population at 
hand is Category 4 (net low risk but may change or accumulate). As 
described above, although the potential risks posed by Smaller Charities 
may be low, they cannot honestly be described as “stable.”389 Thus, 
                                                     
388. It very well may be the case that the IRS is relying upon state attorneys general to monitor 
the management of charities. If this is the case, however, this trust is misplaced. See Mayer & 
Wilson, supra note 42, at 494 (“The widespread criticism of the current system is that while 
attorneys general have this authority in theory they rarely exercise it in fact, and when they do 
exercise it, they do so in flawed ways.”). 
389. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 136. 
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Category 4’s recognition that the risks are “capable of producing 
intolerable harms/impacts” is apt because it recognizes the ability for 
Smaller Charities to grow and evolve into larger charities.390 Further, 
although “good management” might reduce such risks, there is no 
indication that the application process establishes the education 
necessary to establish such managerial oversight.391 Finally, and most 
relevant to this discussion, this category recognizes the fact that if a 
large number of Smaller Charities engaged in excessive amounts of 
Disfavored Activities, the cumulative impact would undermine the 
public’s faith in the entire charitable sector. In other words, this 
population represents a risk that may accumulate. Thus, of the four 
categories, Category 4 most suitably describes the risks presented by 
Smaller Charities, and we therefore find ourselves on the right side of 
the GRID, with regulatory intensity ranging from low to high, depending 
on the nature of the regulated entity. 
3. The Second Step: The Nature of the Regulated Population 
Once the regulatory body has properly categorized the nature of the 
risk, the next step is to identify the nature of the regulated population.392 
To do so, Black and Baldwin ask the regulator to consider two factors: 
motivation to comply and capacity to comply.393 
The motivation of Smaller Charities to comply is difficult to measure. 
Black and Baldwin do not provide a definition of “motivation,” so we 
are left with the commonly understood meaning of the word. Although a 
number of dictionary definitions exist, the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
definition might be the most useful, because it defines “motivation” as 
“the general desire or willingness of someone to do something; drive; 
enthusiasm.”394 This definition forces the regulator to consider the 
desire, or level of enthusiasm, inherent in the regulated population, 
which is directly related to the level of risk that the population presents. 
In other words, a population that is highly motivated to comply with 
regulations (for instance, a population that has an enthusiasm to comply) 
will require lower levels of regulatory scrutiny. The task is, therefore, to 
identify the level of enthusiasm of Smaller Charities to comply with 
                                                     
390. Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 7 tbl. 1. 
391. Id. (“The activity is capable of producing intolerable harms/impacts in the periods between 
regulators’ strategy reviews but risks are reduced by good management.”) 
392. Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 136. 
393. Id. 
394.
Motivation, Oxford English Dictionary, https://oed.com/view/Entry/122708?redirectedFrom=motivation#eid (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
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regulatory requirements. Given the breadth of potential charities that 
might fall below the $50,000 gross annual receipts threshold—a 
category that includes any number of different types of organizations 
with different levels of management—it might not be possible to label 
the population either “well motivated” or “less motivated.” Further, 
there is no reason to assume that the size of an organization has any 
bearing on such organization’s level of motivation to comply. One can 
easily imagine small organizations that have high motivation to comply 
with regulations, perhaps because they routinely partner with larger 
organizations that require such compliance. Similarly, one can imagine a 
smaller organization that is under no such third-party pressure to 
comply, making it less motivated. The population is simply too diverse 
to impose a single assumption about motivation levels. Thus, we must 
turn to the second factor, capacity, to determine where Smaller Charities 
should fall vertically on the GRID. 
With respect to capacity, Black and Baldwin refer to organizations 
that are “well informed, resourced, and organized to foster compliance” 
as those with high capacity for compliance.395 In terms of whether 
Smaller Charities are well-informed, we are once again faced with the 
problem of the breadth and diversity of the class. There is a chance that 
some Smaller Charities are quite well-informed about the regulatory 
requirements imposed upon tax-exempt entities. Such a charity might, 
for example, have a nonprofit lawyer on its board of directors. But the 
relative lack of resources available to many Smaller Charities suggests 
the opposite. The combination of the general lack of access to low-cost 
legal advice in most parts of the country with the low resources of the 
regulated population results in the probability of a large number of 
organizations that do not have the capacity to engage qualified advisors. 
Further, as noted earlier, the Streamlined Application fails to adequately 
educate applicants on the proper means of operating a charity. This is 
evident not only in the insufficiency of the instructions to the 
application, but also to the fact that studies show a high incidence of 
noncompliance of Streamlined Application filers with respect to the 
organizational requirements of tax-exemption.396 Thus, the combination 
of low resources and poor education leaves Streamlined Application 
filers poorly informed. 
For the second component of capacity—the level of resources of the 
regulated population—we do not need to speculate. By definition, 
Streamlined Application filers have few assets and reasonably expect 
                                                     
395. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 136. 
396. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2. 
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low levels of gross receipts.397 In other words, the fact that these 
organizations reasonably believe they will make no more than $50,000 
in gross receipts per year398 likely means that these organizations, by 
definition, are not “well resourced.”399 It is also reasonable to assume 
that most Smaller Charities spend the majority of their gross receipts on 
programming and have little remaining funds for compliance.400 Indeed, 
many nonprofits with revenues greater than $100,000 report severe 
shortcomings in computers and training.401 It is not a stretch to assume 
organizations with half the revenues will be even less well-resourced. 
And although there are certainly some Streamlined Application filers 
who may have competent representation or counselors, they are likely to 
represent the minority of applicants. 
The last characteristic of compliance capacity—the level of 
organization—is difficult to generalize for Smaller Charities. Such an 
organization might be run by a lean group of dedicated professionals, 
with well-defined roles and laudable levels of organization. But just as 
likely (indeed, perhaps more likely) is a charity run by founders with a 
level of dedication to the charity’s mission that might not match the level 
of commitment to organizational operations and regulatory 
requirements. Although this characteristic is difficult to predict for 
Smaller Charities, the other two characteristics—whether the charity is 
well-resourced and well-informed—may be easier to deduce. In sum, 
these three factors strongly suggest that Smaller Charities are more 
likely than not to have a low capacity to comply. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that while charities that opt to use the Streamlined 
Application may vary in terms of their level of motivation, they will 
likely have a low capacity to comply. Thus, keeping in mind that we 
have already placed Smaller Charities in Category 4, the GRID suggests 
either medium to low regulatory intensity or high regulatory intensity, 
depending on the level of motivation. 
4. The Third Step: Selecting the Appropriate Intervention 
Once the nature of the low-risk activity and the nature of the regulatee 
have been identified, Black and Baldwin suggest applying the identified 
                                                     
397. See Instructions for Form 1023-EZ, supra note 15. 
398. Id. 
399. See Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 19. 
400. See NONPROFIT OVERHEAD COST PROJECT, CTR. ON NONPROFITS & PHILANTHROPY, 
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intensity to appropriate tools.402 However, choosing the right tools is not 
self-evident. Black and Baldwin suggest the following list of 




Potential Tools for Low-Risk Sites/Activities 
 
Screening and rule-based strategies 
1. Exemptions without notification or registration 
2. Exemptions with notification or registration 
3. Registration plus conditions/rules; permit and licensing systems 
4. Application of general binding rules without 
notification/registration 
Inspection/monitoring and proxy strategies 
Inspection and/or monitoring by an agency 
5. Frequency-adjusted inspections or monitoring 
6. Regulatory audits 
7. Themed inspections or monitoring 
8. Random inspections or monitoring 
9. Advice and assistance visits 
10. Reactive investigations, responding to complaints, whistle-blowing 
or post-incident investigations 
11. Surveillance 
Proxy measures 
12. Benchmarking or “yardsticking” strategies 
13. Measuring indirect/proxy outcomes 
Firm-based measures 
14. Self-monitoring and self-certification by regulated firms 
15. Management-based strategies including mandatory performance 
disclosure by regulated firms 
Using third-party monitors 
16. Third-party monitoring 
17. Information and inspection-sharing regimes 
Engagement and incentive strategies 
18. Information campaigns, generic advice, and recommendations 
(including codes and guidance) 
19. Dialogue with interested parties 
20. Industry or NGO/interested party-led solutions 
21. Multi-agency approaches 
22. Incentive strategies 
                                                     
402. Black & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 21. 
403. Id. 
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Just as the GRID is not an equation in which regulators may input a 
regulatory puzzle in order to receive a perfect regulatory solution, the 
tools suggested in the table above are fact-specific. Black and Baldwin 
stress that each tool has its “strengths and weaknesses,” and suggest that 
the tools “can be used in combination.”404 Regulators are encouraged to 
weigh each tool in light of the regulatory goals and the limits of the 
controlling legislation.405 By way of example, third-party monitoring 
(number 16 in the chart above) “requires close supervision of the third-
party monitors,” which suggests a resource-intensive endeavor.406 Thus, 
resource-strapped agencies might not be able to rely upon this tool. 
Further, depending on “how the scheme is designed and implemented,” a 
third-party monitoring tool “may or may not be done transparently, and 
may or may not be able to respond to change.”407 Therefore, if 
transparency and flexibility are highly valued by the agency, this tool 
may not be appropriate. 
The IRS’s current regime appears to consist of a combination of the 
following tools: (2) Exemptions with notification or registration (e.g., 
the Streamlined Application), (6) Regulatory audits (e.g., spot audits 
conducted by the IRS), and (14) Self-monitoring and self-certification by 
regulated firms (for instance, submission of annual information reports). 
But if the previous sections were convincing, two of the three tools are 
insufficient; the Streamlined Application fails the screening function—
negating tool 2—and the e-Postcard effectively exempts Smaller 
Charities from the monitoring function of tool 14. Given the paucity of 
information on the e-Postcard, that leaves audits (tool 6) as the only 
back-end regulatory tool available to the IRS. 
If audits are the only remaining tool for regulating Smaller Charities, 
then the regime is inadequate. Although regulatory agencies increasingly 
rely on audits to ensure compliance with the law, the effectiveness of 
audits is hindered by inadequate funding. This is because effective audits 
require significant investment, including funding to recruit and retain 
qualified auditors, implement rigorous standards for audits, and ensure 
the absence of conflicts between the auditor and the regulated 
population.408 However, even if an agency has the financial capability to 
                                                     
404. Id. at 17–18. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. at 18. 
407. Id. 
408. Sasha Courville, Christine Parker & Helen Watchirs, Introduction: Auditing in Regulatory 
Perspective, 25 LAW & POL’Y 179, 180 (2003) (“An audit might promise to compensate for lack of 
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implement a meaningful audit program, the very nature of audits—an 
individual investigator digging deep into an individual organization—is 
an inefficient and “labor-intensive approach.”409 For this reason, the 
National Taxpayer Advocate said that “[w]hile audits serve a role in 
furthering taxpayer compliance, they are no substitute for preventative, 
front-end efforts to avoid compliance issues in the first place.”410 
Further, even a well-designed and well-funded audit regime is expensive 
and “diverts tax dollars” to enforcement and squanders “taxpayer 
donations” on compliance.411 Thus, commentators view audits as a 
valuable complement to a robust regulatory regime, but they cannot 
serve as a substitute for more holistic regulation. 
Further, the discussion of the effectiveness of audits is a bit beside the 
point, because the limited budget of the IRS renders frequent audits 
virtually impossible.412 To illustrate this impossibility, note that in 2011, 
Colinvaux bemoaned the fact that the despite “[s]ignificant growth” in 
the charitable sector, the IRS boasted an audit rate of “about one-third of 
one percent” of all charities.413 Proffered as proof of a failure to regulate, 
this audit rate is practically astronomical compared to the current audit 
rate of charities.414 For fiscal year 2017, the IRS received 1,528,487 
annual information returns.415 Of these returns, the IRS reviewed a total 
                                                                                                                      
government regulatory oversight and to provide accountability for organizational behavior. Yet the 
capacity of an audit to do so depends on the answers to a number of questions: Who are the 
auditors? What is their expertise? How are they regulated or accredited? What is their relationship 
to the auditee? What methods do the auditors use to collect data or evidence? How, if at all, do they 
sample the data to be checked? To what extent do they use fieldwork, rely on expert opinions, rely 
on checks of internal controls and systems? How widely do they consult and to what extent do they 
rely on consultations? How authentic is the participation of any stakeholders? How do the auditors 
form an opinion on the data or evidence? Who sets the parameters of the opinion that the auditor is 
to form? To what extent are the audit findings negotiated with the auditee before being published? 
What is the response of the auditees to the audit? Is it possible to measure the impact of the audit 
process? In what intended and/or unintended ways does the prospect or reality of audit change the 
behavior of the auditee? Is there evidence of ‘creative compliance’ to maintain autonomy while 
appearing to comply? Is there evidence of dysfunctional side-effects or conflicts between the 
consequences of audit and effectiveness or performance?”). 
409. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 37. 
410. Id. 
411. Id. 
412. See Rossman, supra note 121, at 97 (“Due to limited staffing, the IRS Tax Exempt Division 
typically reviews less than two percent of the 990s it receives and audits returns at a rate of one-
third of one percent.”). 
413. Colinvaux, supra note 308, at 17 (“For the 2007-2008 filing year, the IRS received 888,412 
information returns. To review all these returns, the IRS assigned 461 employees, with the result 
that 2,946 returns were examined . . . .”). 
414. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 6 (2017). This number includes Forms 990, 990-
EZ, 990-N, 990-PF, and 990-T. 
415. Id. 
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of 2,677 returns.416 This works out to an audit rate of 0.175%, or about 
half of what Colinvaux deemed unacceptably low in 2011.417 This 
represents approximately one audit for every 570 annual information 
returns submitted. Given these numbers, it is little surprise that critics 
argue that a reliance upon audits “invites noncompliance.”418 Once a 
regulated population learns that audits are unlikely, it is reasonable to 
assume the regulated population may feel free to engage in more risky 
behavior. 
Thus, even assuming the sufficiency of the three tools implemented 
by the IRS—applications, audits, and reporting—the fact that Smaller 
Charities are exempted from two of the tools (a rigorous application and 
meaningful reporting) and the remaining tool (audits) is expensive and 
underused, renders the tools for regulating Smaller Charities virtually 
nonexistent. This regime fails to rise to Black and Baldwin’s challenge 
to recognize that “as risk types move east on the GRID and firm types 
move south, it is likely to be appropriate to apply enforcement strategies 
with increasing regulatory intensity.”419 This failure makes reassessment 
and flexibility, the next challenge, all the more vital, so agencies can 
recognize regulatory failures and adjust the regime accordingly. 
Unfortunately, as the next section makes clear, the IRS has exhibited 
either an inability or unwillingness to reassess, and any professed 
flexibility is meaningless without honest assessment of the current 
regulatory failure. 
C. The Third Challenge: Reassessment and Flexibility 
The third challenge inherent in risk-based regulation is the need to 
reassess regulatory tools and maintain flexibility to properly address 
risk.420 This challenge addresses the danger of an agency ignoring 
changing circumstances that demand new regulatory tools or a 
reconsideration of the risk assessment. If new risks emerge or if the 
environment changes such that the regulatory regime is no longer 
responsive to likely risks, a lack of flexibility will doom regulatory 
effectiveness.421 Further, political realities often conspire to ossify 
                                                     
416. Id. at 34. Depressingly, this number likely represents a slightly inflated audit rate, as the 
reviewed annual information returns include forms not reflected in the 1,528,487 returns, as it 
includes Forms 1041-A, 1120-POL, and 5227.  
417. Colinvaux, supra note 308, at 17. 
418. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 37. 
419. Black & Baldwin, supra note 37, at 141. 
420. Id. 
421. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 329, at 288 (Regulators “become unresponsive to changing 
circumstances so that they fail to detect and deal with new risks and changes in risk profiles.”). 
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regulatory measures into “institutionalized process[es],” resulting in a 
regulator that is resistant to change.422 Applied to the water pollution 
hypothetical, imagine that the agency applies higher scrutiny to the high 
polluting paper mill and imposes low-intensity regulations on smaller 
polluters. This regulatory approach is successful only if the number and 
intensity of the smaller polluters remain static. If the number of smaller 
polluters grows dramatically, the pollution will also grow. Thus, a 
regulatory approach that refuses to adapt will fail. 
With respect to adaptability, the IRS did not completely ignore the 
criticisms of the Streamlined Application, and it implemented changes in 
2018.423 The willingness to amend the screening tool reflects an 
encouraging potential to have the requisite ability to reassess and remain 
flexible. However, the changes do not inspire confidence. Although 
besieged by a number of criticisms and facing evidence that Smaller 
Charities do not meet organizational requirements of tax-exempt 
entities,424 the amendments to the Streamlined Application were quite 
modest. Indeed, the totality of the changes amount to little more than a 
requirement of a mission statement and an attestation as to the estimated 
annual gross receipts and total assets of the applicant.425 The revisions 
failed to address the issues presented by the two studies conducted by 
the Taxpayer Advocate426 by, for example, requiring copies of 
organizational documents to ensure proper compliance with the 
organizational requirement. Indeed, one wonders what inspired the 
changes. Regardless, after the IRS was confronted with four years of 
data and strong evidence of regulatory failure, it failed to either properly 
assess the Streamlined Application’s failure, adequately revise the form 
to respond to the criticisms, or exhibit requisite flexibility to react to 
proven and well-documented regulatory failure. 
IV. FOCUS ON MONITORING 
Despite its general inaction, the IRS is aware of the shortcomings of 
                                                     
422. Id.  
423. See January 19, 2018 Exempt Organizations Update: E-News for Charities and 
Nonprofits, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/current-edition-of-exempt-organizations-
update [https://perma.cc/28T7-PGJC]. 
424. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 42. 
425. See Form 1023-EZ Revisions, IRS, www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-1023-ez-
revisions [https://perma.cc/6LMP-A33M]. The revision also addresses organizations that had their 
tax-exempt status automatically revoked for failure to submit three consecutive annual information 
returns, requiring any application for reinstatement to be for the “same foundation classification [the 
applicant] had at the time of the automatic revocation.” Id. 
426. See 2015 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 36. 
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the Streamlined Application. Recognizing the public’s desire to discern 
between filers of the Form 1023 and the Streamlined Application, the 
IRS began to publish lists of Streamlined Application filers.427 The IRS 
justified this decision by arguing that the publication would “allow 
taxpayers to more easily research information on tax-exempt 
organizations.”428 This is a curious statement, and it betrays a lingering 
distrust of Streamlined Application filers. After all, taxpayers were able 
to search the IRS list of exempt organizations to learn the tax-exempt 
status of any given charity,429 and once a taxpayer found the charity on 
this list, the taxpayer knew the tax treatment of any potential donation.430 
Given this, what precisely is gained by publishing a list of Streamlined 
Application filers unless there is something inherently suspicious about 
such organizations? The strong implication is that charities which opted 
to use the Streamlined Application are less trustworthy than charities 
that filed Form 1023s. One could argue that the publication of 
Streamlined Application filers is an admission by the IRS that the 
Streamlined Application fails to properly vet applicants. In the very 
least, it implies that the IRS is more cautious about Streamlined 
Application filers. After all, if the process were fulfilling its role, there 
would be no need to distinguish between filers of different applications. 
Perhaps the focus on the shortcomings of the Streamlined Application 
is misplaced. Given that limited resources have strangled the IRS’s 
ability to properly screen applicants, continued tweaks to the 
Streamlined Application are not likely to address the problem because 
the simple fact remains that a rigorous and searching application would 
not help if the IRS’s budget constraints persist. Thus, critics of the 
Streamlined Application might be fighting a losing battle. Rather than 
calling for an abolishment of the Streamlined Application,431 critics 
might find more traction in focusing on back-end regulation. As 
                                                     




429. See Tax Exempt Organization Search, IRS, https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ [perma.cc/VR78-
SFHH].  
430. For example, the website listed whether the organization was public charity or private 
foundation. If the organization was not listed, then the taxpayer knew that a donation would not be 
tax deductible. 
431. See, e.g., Letter from David Thompson, Vice President, Nat’l Council of Nonprofits, to 
Lynn Jenkins and John Lewis, U.S. House Representatives (Apr. 6, 2018) (“By any measure, the 
problems with the express-lane approach to tax exemption continue and, indeed, are 
increasing . . . . And the IRS’ primary obligation of preventing ineligible organizations and perhaps 
bad actors from receiving and exploiting tax-exempt status for personal gain is being shirked with 
every application processed. [The Streamlined Application] should be withdrawn immediately.”). 
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evidenced by the IRS’s decision to publish lists of Streamlined 
Application filers, the agency is willing to provide as much data as 
possible to allow the general public to make informed decisions 
concerning charities. The reason for this willingness may be driven by 
resource scarcity—after all, publishing a list of filers is a relatively 
inexpensive way to address inadequate regulatory measures—but only a 
cynic would ignore the potential that low-cost disclosure might have in 
addressing the faults of the application process. 
Following this line of thinking, critics of the current regime should 
not focus on further tweaks and amendments to the Streamlined 
Application. Any meaningful revisions would require more front-end 
resources that are simply unavailable. However, there is an obvious low-
cost alternative: implement a more rigorous monitoring tool for Smaller 
Charities. More precisely, rather than an absence of both front-end and 
back-end regulation, the IRS could bolster the monitoring tool for any 
charities that may have benefitted from less scrutiny on the front-end. In 
other words, the IRS should abolish the e-Postcard and require all 
Smaller Charities to file the Form 990-EZ. 
A. Form 990-EZs for All 
As noted above, the e-Postcard is utterly useless.432 It produces no 
financial data, no reporting on salaries, and no disclosure of activities. It 
is, in effect, little more than an assurance that someone related to the 
organization is willing to spend fifteen minutes a year to let the IRS 
know it exists.433 But if the IRS were to require Smaller Charities to file 
the Form 990-EZ, many of the concerns about Disfavored Activities 
would be addressed. For example, part IV of the Form 990-EZ requires 
charities to list “each person who was an officer, director, trustee, or key 
employee[434] . . . of the organization at any time during the 
organization’s tax year.”435 For each such person, the charity must 
disclose reportable compensation,436 deferred compensation,437 and 
                                                     
432. See supra section I.C.3. 
433. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (showing an example of a completed Form 990-N). 
434. “Key employee” is defined as, “any person having responsibilities or powers similar to those 
of officers, directors, or trustees.” INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-EZ, supra note 135, at 17 (“The 
term includes the chief management and administrative officials of an organization (such as an 
executive director or chancellor). A chief financial officer and the officer in charge of the 
administration or program operations are both key employees if they have the authority to control 
the organization’s activities, its finances, or both.”).  
435. Id. 
436. See Form 990-EZ, supra note 124, at pt. IV, l.c. 
437. Id. at pt. IV, l.d. 
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fringe benefits.438 This disclosure would help address concerns about 
unreasonable or excessive salaries. Further, the Form 990-EZ requires 
some detail on commercial activity and fees charged for charitable 
services, as applicants are required to disclose the “total program service 
revenue (exempt function income)” of the charity.439 Such a disclosure 
would partially address the concerns regarding excessive commercial 
activity or unreasonably high fees for services. 
Perhaps most attractive to the IRS, there is little cost associated with 
implementing this solution because the Form 990-EZ is already in place. 
Further, the public nature of Form 990-EZs means that the IRS can, in 
effect, share the burden of monitoring with the public.440 Unlike the 
vetting process, which is necessarily limited to agency action, 
monitoring responsibilities might be shared.441 If all organizations, 
including Smaller Charities, were required to file more robust annual 
information returns, a charity engaging in impermissible commercial 
activity or paying unreasonable salaries to insiders would make such 
data available for any interested party. This includes, of course, the IRS, 
but it also will be available to state regulators, potential victims of unfair 
competition, and potential donors.442 
B. Require a More Searching Form 990-EZ 
Requiring the Form 990-EZ for all charities is an elegant and virtually 
cost-free solution, but it is not a cure-all. As noted above, the Form 990-
EZ fails to differentiate among the different types of commercial 
activity. All “program service revenue” is disclosed in a single total 
amount that includes fees for service, program-related investment 
income, unrelated business income, and income derived from 
government fees and contracts.443 Thus, if the goal is to disclose the 
specific data necessary to identify high fees for service or commercial 
activity that unfairly competes with for-profit entities, the form will need 
to be amended to require more specific details. 
Such an amendment has some precedent. As recently as 2008, the 
Form 990 was redesigned to be more responsive to current needs.444 
                                                     
438. Id. at pt. IV, l.e. 
439. See Instructions for Form 990-EZ, supra note 135, at 11.  
440. Andrew Elmore, Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 72, 76 (2017).  
441. Id. 
442. Id. 
443. See Instructions for Form 990-EZ, supra note 135, at 11–12. 
444. Form 990 Redesign for Tax Year 2008 (Filed in 2009), Frequently Asked Questions, 
IRS.gov (Aug. 22, 2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/990r_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ME4-
V7U9]. 
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According to the IRS, the previous version “failed to reflect the changes 
in the law and the increasing size, diversity, and complexity of the tax-
exempt sector” which resulted in a failure to meet “the Service’s tax 
compliance interests or . . . the transparency and accountability needs of 
the states, the general public, and communities served by the 
organizations.”445 The same might be said of the annual information 
reports used today.446 The adoption of the Streamlined Application 
certainly qualifies as one of the “changes in the law” that would demand 
adjustments to reporting requirements, especially if one considers the 
widespread use of the e-Postcard. Maybe more importantly, the required 
change would be minimal. Rather than permitting Form 990-EZ filers to 
provide a single total amount of all program service revenue, the form 
would be amended to require filers to disclose unrelated business 
income, related business income, and income derived from fees for 
service (and how those fees are determined) as separate line items. 
Admittedly, it is unlikely that the IRS would find regulatory resources 
necessary to review this additional information, but the public would, in 
the very least, have the data necessary to make informed decisions about 
which charities to support, and state regulators would have access to data 
that may inspire more policing. 
CONCLUSION 
Many areas of the law fail to meet the expectations of the general 
public, and charity law is no exception. While the general public’s 
conception of charity does not likely include paying salaries, engaging in 
commercial activity, or charging fees for service, the fact remains that 
charities frequently engage in these activities. Although the plain 
meaning of many of the laws governing charities suggests more 
restriction, over a century of case law and agency actions have combined 
to result in a more lenient regime. Compounding the problem, the IRS is 
overburdened and underfunded. We therefore face a regulatory failure. 
So long as the regulatory failure remains unaddressed, these activities by 
charities will continue. This will ultimately result in harming the 
                                                     
445. See IRS, SUMMARY OF FORM 990 REDESIGN PROCESS, (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/summary_form_990_redesign_process.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UHB2-5CEG]. 
446. I am not the first commentator to call for a more robust disclosure regime. See, e.g., 
Rossman, supra note 121, at 107 (“The IRS could revise the Form 990 to elicit more specific 
information from economic development organizations about their activities, including the names, 
types, and locations of businesses they assist; the forms of aid they provide; the number and types of 
jobs this aid creates; and other information relevant to understanding the relative public and private 
benefit generated by the organization’s activities.”). 
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reputation of the entire charitable sector. To the extent potential donors 
cannot ensure that their donations will be spent in a charitable manner, 
they will have less incentive to give, and the warm glow enjoyed by 
charities will fade. 
This does not have to be the case. Although the IRS’s decision to 
create a virtual self-certification process for aspiring charities drew sharp 
criticism, one might conclude that it was a reasonable response by an 
agency facing a budgetary shortfall. But the IRS went too far, and the 
paucity of effective screening or monitoring mechanisms is 
unacceptable. In a perfect world, the IRS would have the funding to 
more strictly assess and regulate charities, but this is not realistic. Thus, 
the most direct means of remedy the situation is to impose more robust 
reporting requirements on Smaller Charities. In doing so, we would give 
the public the ability to monitor Smaller Charities, and hopefully stem 
the erosion of the public’s faith in the charitable sector. 
 
 
